Better Trials through Science: A Defense of Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration by Tanford, J. Alexander & Tanford, Sarah
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 66 | Number 4 Article 3
4-1-1988
Better Trials through Science: A Defense of
Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration
J. Alexander Tanford
Sarah Tanford
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
J. A. Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials through Science: A Defense of Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 741 (1988).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol66/iss4/3
BETTER TRIALS THROUGH SCIENCE: A
DEFENSE OF PSYCHOLOGIST-LAWYER
COLLABORATION
J. ALEXANDER TANFORDt
SARAH TANFORDt-
A concern of some legal commentators is that lawyers may use psychological
persuasion techniques to gain an unfair advantage over their courtroom opponents
and subvert the justice system. In this Article, the Tanfords respond to an earlier
Article in which Professor Victor Gold raised such concerns. The Tanfords argue
that commentators like Gold misunderstand jury behavior and trial process, exag-
gerating the negative impact of lawyers aided by psychologists. To the contrary,
lawyer/psychologist collaboration improves rational decision making by identify-
ing existing biases and devising strategies to correct them. The Tanfords conclude
these benefits outweigh any possible abuse, and no reason exists to fear scientific
knowledge or to control its infusion into the trial process.
One recurring theme in our culture is that science is dangerous. From Dr.
Frankenstein's monster to Dr. Chandra's HAL 9000 computer, the creations of
scientists seem to have a tendency to run amok. A variation on this theme was
expressed recently in the pages of the North Carolina Law Review. In Covert
Advocacy: Reflections on the Use of Psychological Persuasion Techniques in the
Courtroom, Professor Victor Gold raises a cry of alarm that psychologists may
have created superlawyers who are able to control the decision making process
of juries.' Gold claims that, by gathering and disseminating empirical informa-
tion about persuasion and jury behavior, social scientists have armed trial law-
yers with psychological weapons capable of severely damaging jurors' abilities to
decide cases based on evidence. He argues that this use of science is subverting
the legitimacy of our trial system and must be controlled. With this Article,
Professor Gold joins a number of other critics of American trial practice who
worry about the erosion of the trial system's truth-seeking function. 2
To the contrary, the infusion of scientific knowledge into trial practice has
had a generally positive effect. Psychologists have identified a myriad of factors
that affect jury decision making but have nothing to do with the merits of the
t Associate Professor, School of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. J.D. 1976; LL.M.
1979, Duke University.
tt Assistant Professor, Department of Psychological Sciences, Purdue University. Ph.D.
1983, University of Wisconsin-Madison. The authors are grateful to Michael Saks, Ken Kress, and
Craig Bradley for their helpful comments, and to Joe Thornton for his superb editing.
1. Gold, Covert Advocacy: Reflections on the Use of Psychological Persuasion Techniques in the
Courtroom, 65 N.C.L. REv. 481 (1987).
2. See generally J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 106 (1949); Frankel, The Search for Truth: An
Umpireal View, in LAWYER'S ETHICS 99, 100 (A. Gerson ed. 1980), both criticizing the trial system
for rating truth too low among its goals; see also Etzioni, Creating an Imbalance, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec.
1q74. at 28 (scientific jury selection gives one side an advantage and should be banned).
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case. By communicating this information to trial lawyers, they have decreased
the likelihood that these extraneous influences will affect verdicts. This collabo-
rative process of identifying existing barriers to rational decision making and
devising strategies to reduce their impact has improved the chances that juries
will understand and consider each litigant's case without bias.
The purpose of this Article is to respond to critics such as Professor Gold
who fear that cooperation between psychologists and lawyers may subvert the
truth-seeking function of the trial by enhancing lawyers' abilities to influence
and deceive jurors. We believe the critics have made three mistakes in arriving at
their pessimistic conclusions. First, they have fundamentally misunderstood
several aspects of the science of psychology. They misunderstand basic jury be-
havior and cognitive processes, erroneously assuming that jurors are naturally
unbiased and passive participants in trials. Critics have misread the psychologi-
cal literature, exaggerating the likelihood that nonevidentiary factors, such as
style of speech, will have a relatively high impact on juror decision making com-
pared to legitimate evidence. Also, they have misunderstood scientists, errone-
ously believing that most psychologists would be willing to participate in
partisan deception of jurors. Second, the critics misunderstand or misstate the
legal theory and structure of the trial process. They use a trial model in which
jurors are presented with a single version of the facts, and persuasion techniques
are used only to divert jurors away from those facts. The critics assume that
truth seeking is the only legitimate jurisprudential principle of trials, and no
legal mechanism exists to prevent tricks and deception. This paradigm is incon-
sistent with our complex adversary trial process, in which parties present com-
peting images of truth. Third, the critics ignore the benefits that have resulted
from psychologist-lawyer collaboration and the ways psycholegal research has
improved the likelihood that trials will result in fair, accurate, and unbiased
verdicts.
In Part I of this Article we analyze the nature of the attack on psychologist-
lawyer collaboration as expressed by Professor Gold. In Part II we explain the
ways in which critics have misunderstood the nature of psychological scientific
inquiry and exaggerated the kinds of conclusions that can be drawn from
psycholegal research. In Part III we argue that the critics have misconceived
and oversimplified the nature of our trial system, and we put forth a more appro-
priate theoretical model that accords adversariness an important role in a com-
plex legal structure. In Part IV we summarize the benefits of the psychologist-
lawyer collaboration. We conclude that, on balance, psychologist-lawyer collab-
oration has begun to produce better trials. We believe these benefits outweigh
the risk that it will be misused, and no reason exists to fear scientific knowledge
or to try to control its infusion into the trial process.
I. THE ATTACK ON PSYCHOLOGIST-LAWYER COLLABORATION
In Covert Advocacy: Reflections on the Use of Psychological Persuasion
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Techniques in the Courtroom,3 Professor Gold has raised serious and troubling
charges about the efficacy of collaboration between psychologists and trial law-
yers. He argues that because of the increasing body of psychological literature,
trial lawyers have been able to improve their courtroom effectiveness to the point
where they can covertly control how juries decide cases, and even deceive juries
into deciding contrary to the evidence. If these charges were true, it would raise
grave doubts about the continued legitimacy of our trial system. Professor Gold
argues that this infusion of science into trial practice already has undermined the
ability of the jury to function properly, and that it must be controlled to assure
that future disputes are fairly settled on their merits within the adversary
system.
This criticism and its pessimistic conclusion seem to rest on several implicit
assumptions about psychology and the proper functioning of the trial system.
They reflect the belief that our trial process produced better results before psy-
chologists started meddling with it; now that lawyers are using sophisticated
techniques based on psycholegal research, they are upsetting the natural balance
and subverting the proper function of the trial. Moreover, critics claim, trial
attorneys have become capable of inducing jurors to make bad decisions based
on biases and other improper factors, and no existing mechanism can prevent
such abuse. This argument can be broken down into several psychological as-
sumptions about how jurors reach decisions and the nature of psycholegal re-
search, and several legal assumptions about the theory and structure of trials.
A. The Charges Against Psychology
The most fundamental assumption one must make in order to condemn
psychologist-lawyer collaboration is that the legal system would be better off
without psychologists. One must believe that jurors in their "natural" state, not
subjected to psychological persuasion techniques, will return more accurate, im-
partial verdicts, based on a rational consideration of the evidence. The premise
that jurors are inherently unbiased or that they can easily put aside their biases is
implicit throughout Professor Gold's article. Although he recognizes that all
people hold personal biases to some extent,4 Gold clearly expresses the common
belief that it is nevertheless possible to seat an impartial jury that will "in good
faith put aside its biases and logically choose which evidence and arguments to
accept and which to reject." 5 He dismisses the idea that "normal" juror deci-
sion making is affected by inherent biases and prejudices to a significant extent.6
He also rejects the idea that jury decision making is normally affected by extra-
3. Gold, supra note 1.
4. Gold, supra note 1, at 492.
5. Gold, supra note 1, at 501.
6. For example, Gold refers to the Duke law and language project, see, e.g., W. O'BARR,
LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE: LANGUAGE, POWER AND STRATEGY IN THE COURTROOM (1982); Conley,
O'Barr & Lind, The Power of Language: Presentational Style in the Courtroom, 1978 DUKE L.J.
1375, as investigating whether "lawyers can induce jurors to make judgments about the credibility of
a speaker through manipulation of the 'powerfulness' of the speaker's language," Gold, supra note 1,
at 484. Gold thereby implies that jurors would not make such judgments without the manipulation.
See also L. WRIGHTSMAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 240-41 (1987) (this assumption
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neous nonevidentiary factors, such as the presentational styles of attorneys. Pro-
fessor Gold seems to think that unless lawyers consciously use psychological
techniques, their presentations do not affect juror information processing. 7
Thus, the first assumption is that if trials were conducted without the aid of
psychologists, "neutral" decision making would occur, because jurors have a
natural ability to put aside their biases and reach rational decisions based only
on the evidence. 8
The second basic assumption one must make in order to attack psycholo-
gist-lawyer collaboration is that psycholegal research can be used successfully to
divert the jury away from the facts. This assumption essentially concerns jurors'
cognitive processes-it assumes that during trial, jurors passively receive infor-
mation and process this information automatically rather than consciously.
This assumption is implicit in the title of Professor Gold's Article, "Covert Ad-
vocacy." He obviously believes that attorneys can "induce subconscious jury
decision making on legally improper bases." 9 He writes: "All advocacy tech-
niques described in [this Article] have at least one thing in common: They per-
suade subconsciously. These techniques are intended to affect the jury's
thinking about the case covertly, without the jury's full conscious awareness of
what is affecting its thinking or why." 10 Gold fears attorneys can easily deceive
jurors into making decisions on improper bases because jurors "cannot scruti-
nize and choose to reject a message from the advocate that is received on a
subconscious level."'" So powerful is his view of subconscious decision making
that Gold doubts whether even the jurors' conscious processes can overcome its
influence. He writes that the jury may continue to be "unaware that a subcon-
scious process" is taking place even after "they have been cautioned against
fit]."'12 Thus, the second premise is that in the judgment process, jurors will
tend to process nonevidentiary information subconsciously to the detriment of
conscious decision making.
Gold also assumes that valid conclusions about psychology can be drawn
from the books and articles most easily available to lawyers. He assumes this
is common); Gold, supra note 1, at 492 (jurors normally unbiased, and only psychologists think
biased jurors exist).
7. For example, Gold refers to experiments concerning attorney style, language, and dress as
testing whether juries can be "induce[d] ... to employ legally irrelevant or improper considerations
in their decisionmaking," apparently assuming that an attorney's self-presentation ordinarily would
not affect jurors. Gold, supra note 1, at 483, 496.
8. Gold is in part making a historical argument that lawyers have only recently begun using
psychology to improve their presentations. He is undoubtedly correct that access to psycholegal
research is far easier for lawyers today than it ever has been. However, it is doubtful that his model
of a "pure" system, in which no lawyers know about psychology, ever has existed in this century.
Hugo Muensterberg published On the Witness Stand in 1908; Wigmore sarcastically attacked it in
1909. Wigmore, Professor Muensterberg and the Psychology of Evidence, 3 ILL. L. REV. 399 (1909).
Compare Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating, 5 VAND. L. REv. 277, 278-81 (1952)
(complaining that psychologists had not contributed enough to our understanding of trials) with
Saks, The Limits of Scientific Jury Selection: Ethical and Empirical, 17 JURIMETRICS J. 3, 22 (1976)
(psychologist wondering why lawyers ignore the work of psychologists on persuasion).
9. Gold, supra note 1, at 483 (emphasis added).
10. Gold, supra note 1, at 497; see id. at 502.
11. Gold, supra note 1, at 498.
12. Gold, supra note 1, at 504 (emphasis added).
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secondary literature is accurate, contains scientifically justified conclusions, and
fairly "reflect[s] an even larger ... body of academic literature concerning the
cognitive processes of the jury."' 13 Gold draws his conclusions about psychology
and psychological persuasion techniques almost exclusively from "articles re-
cently published in trial advocacy journals." 14 Thus, the third premise is that
articles on psychology written for trial lawyers are scientifically reliable.
A related assumption is that the laboratory results reported in the literature
can be generalized to actual trials. Gold makes the assumption, commonly pres-
ent in trial advocacy materials, that when a scientist finds that some factor af-
fects subjects in a laboratory, it means that factor will have a measurable and
significant impact on the decisions jurors make in real trials. For example, from
O'Barr's finding that powerless speech affects how subjects evaluate a person's
credibility, Gold concludes that in real trials "damage awards [will] decrease
commensurately with a decrease in the apparent social status of the plaintiff."15
Similarly, he concludes that because subjects in experiments are susceptible to
indirect assertions of fact, lawyers who infer unprovable facts can cause jurors
not only to draw inferences in the absence of evidence, but to hold to those
beliefs despite later evidence to the contrary. 16 Gold also states that the use of
various "scientific" jury selection techniques, especially community surveys, not
only helps lawyers reduce uncertainty in exercising challenges, but actually en-
ables them to identify and select the "most favorably biased juries."' 17 He con-
cludes from studies of the effect of attorney self-presentation not just that
matters of style and demeanor affect how jurors perceive evidence, but that ju-
rors actually will be misled if attorneys try to enhance their own credibility.' 8
Thus, the fourth premise is that if something causes a measurable effect in the
laboratory, it causes a significant effect in a real trial.
Part of Professor Gold's attack is based on the assumption that jurors are
disproportionately affected by extraneous, nonevidentiary factors and therefore
are prone to making decisions not based on evidence. Gold appears to believe
that jurors have only a weak ability to put aside induced biases and to reason
logically. 19 At the slightest interference from attorneys, jurors lose whatever
facility they had to reason analytically and tend to accept simplified explanations
and rely on biases and stereotypes.20 He portrays extraneous, nonevidentiary
factors such as the order of presentation, style of speech, and manner of dress as
tending to overwhelm the merits of the case. Gold rejects the position that ju-
13. Gold, supra note 1, at 482.
14. Gold, supra note 1, at 482-83. Gold draws his information about psychology from clinical
legal education programs, books on trial advocacy, and articles in trial advocacy journals. He does
not generally refer to the original scientific literature.
15. Gold, supra note 1, at 485-86.
16. Gold, supra note 1, at 488-89; see also id. at 495 (attorneys can cause jurors to reject expert
testimony by "inferring" facts to the contrary).
17. Gold, supra note 1,.at 493.
18. Gold, supra note 1, at 487-88.
19. See Gold, supra note 1, at 501 (arguing that attorneys can induce jurors to commit errors of
logic).
20. Gold, supra note 1, at 490.
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rors actively evaluate all trial information, both evidentiary and nonevidentiary,
and that evidence is a far more important factor in decision making than juror
biases.21 He states that jurors do not have "the ability to resist [induced] bias
and avoid errors of logic"' 22 and that they can be easily induced "to commit
inferential error[s] in evaluating the meaning of evidence" that cripple their ca-
pacity to reason.23 Thus, the fifth assumption is that jurors are easily diverted
from making decisions based on the evidence.
Gold makes an implicit assumption when he calls for controls on psycholo-
gist-lawyer collaboration: it has been of only minimal benefit to the trial pro-
cess. Gold's Article, for example, focuses almost exclusively on the negative side
of psychologist-lawyer collaboration. He only grudgingly acknowledges that
psychology may be used in any way to facilitate fair and reliable trials. In the
entire Article, Gold devotes only one paragraph to ways in which the "use of
psychological techniques [could] have a desirable effect on jury decisionmak-
ing.' '24 He concedes that "some of these techniques [could help] eliminate extra-
legal distractions[,] detect unfavorable bias in prospective jurors[, and] assist the
jury in better understanding... the evidence," 25 but argues that it nevertheless
must be controlled because psychology will be used primarily for undesirable
purposes. Thus, the sixth premise is that the benefits of psychologist-lawyer col-
laboration are minimal.
The final assumption about psychology concerns psychologists themselves.
Gold has a "legocentric" view of people. He assumes that qualified psycholo-
gists would be as willing to forsake truth and participate in a partisan effort to
deceive the jury as lawyers. He states that "[flor a price, professional psycholo-
gists are available to advise lawyers on all aspects of trial advocacy."'26 Gold
also assumes that no ethical or institutional constraints inhibit psychologists
from performing adversarial roles. He accuses psychologists of not even giving
serious consideration to the "broader implications" of misuse of subliminal per-
suasion techniques because they are "too overcome with the prospects of eco-
nomic or academic rewards to care much about what they may be doing to
another profession." 27 Thus, the seventh premise is that psychologists will be
willing to participate in jury deception.
B. The Legal Assumptions Concerning Trials
Even if the critics' fears about psychology were true, they would still need
to make several legal assumptions about trials in order to condemn the use of
psychological persuasion. Three such assumptions are implicit in Professor
Gold's Article. The first is empirical: trials are one-sided. The second is juris-
21. Gold, supra note 1, at 506-07.
22. Gold, supra note 1, at 502.
23. Gold, supra note 1, at 491; see also id. at 483 (arguing that attorneys can induce juries to
employ improper considerations in decision making).
24. Gold, supra note 1, at 504.
25. Gold, supra note 1, at 504-05.
26. Gold, supra note 1, at 481.
27. Gold, supra note 1, at 483.
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prudential: the only legitimate guiding principle of trials is truth seeking. The
third is doctrinal: no legal mechanism currently controls attempts to deceive the
jury.
The paradigm employed by the critics assumes a one-sided trial in which
only one set of "true" facts will be presented at trial, and one lawyer will employ
psychological persuasion techniques to try to get the jury to decide contrary to
those facts. Implicit throughout Gold's Article is the assumption that the evi-
dence usually will be clear, unconflicting, and not susceptible to different inter-
pretations. For example, when discussing the effects of order of presentation,
Gold refers to lawyers altering the true probative value of evidence.28 Working
against these certain facts is -a single lawyer using psychological persuasion tech-
niques. In Gold's paradigm, a lawyer on the other side never seems to be em-
phasizing the facts and trying to persuade the jury to decide the case based on
the evidence. Gold suggests that in order to mislead the jury the lawyer for one
side may train her witnesses to use powerful speech, induce the opponent's wit-
nesses to use powerless speech, and use powerful speech herself, while the oppo-
nent engages in no such offsetting behavior. 29 He assumes that when an
attorney pits her credibility against an opposing witness, the jury chooses be-
tween them and ignores the opposing lawyer.30 Gold asserts that an attorney
can select a favorably biased jury without interference by the opponent, 3 t and
that one attorney can successfully make the jury disbelieve the evidence merely
by implying untrue facts while the opponent does nothing.32 Although one law-
yer apparently will be able to wreak havoc by using psychology, the opponent
will neither use similar psychological techniques nor object to improprieties.
Gold writes that "advocates are... poorly equipped to respond to subconscious
persuasion" because "[t]he principle tools of the responding advocate" are lim-
ited to "cross-examination, counter-evidence, and argument."' 33 Thus, one as-
sumption about trials is that persuasion techniques will be employed primarily
by one side to divert the jury from the "true" facts without interference by the
other side.
A second premise about trials is jurisprudential. Gold implies that the only
legitimate goal which guides trials is seeking the truth. Any component of a
trial that does not further that goal is to be condemned. In such a system, it is
inappropriate for the lawyer with the weaker case to employ persuasion tech-
niques or try to win; lawyers must facilitate, not obstruct, the search for truth.34
Gold states, for example, that the lawyer's proper purpose during voir dire is "to
28. Gold, supra note 1, at 495-97.
29. Gold, supra note 1, at 484-86.
30. Gold, supra note 1, at 487.
31. Gold, supra note 1, at 493.
32. Gold, supra note 1, at 488-89, 493, 495.
33. Gold, supra note 1, at 504.
34. We are certain that most promoters of trials as searches for truth would deny that they hold
the extreme position that it is inappropriate for the lawyer with the weaker case to try to win. They
probably would allow her to try, as long as she fails in the effort and the truth eventually prevails.
We submit that such an attitude confirms that they really do hold extreme anti-adversarial views and
think it wrong for lawyers with weak cases to try to win the verdict.
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assist the court in selecting a fair and impartial jury."' 35 At other times, his view
that partisan advocacy is not proper is implicit. He writes that because the de-
meanor of lawyers is not one of the legal issues at trial, it should not affect the
jury's verdict. 36 Gold refers to lawyers' attempts to be persuasive as "extrale-
gal"-not just nonevidentiary-bases for decision,37 and accords no jurispru-
dential significance to such persuasion's long history of acceptance. 38 Thus,
another premise is that partisan advocacy is improper.
The third assumption concerning the trial process is that no existing legal
mechanism prevents lawyers from improperly influencing the jury, which ex-
plains the need for new controls on psychologist-lawyer collaboration. Gold's
implicit description of trial procedure is that lawyers can do whatever they want;
opponents have no grounds on which to object to egregious behavior. He ac-
cords no significant abuse prevention role to the objection, 39 stating that the
only tools available to combat covert advocacy are "cross-examination, counter-
evidence, and argument." 4° Implicit in his argument is that rules of trial proce-
dure do not prohibit lawyers from engaging in activities such as implying un-
provable facts in their questions, 41 talking about similarities between prospective
jurors and themselves during voir dire,42 bringing masses of spectators into the
courtroom to distract the jury,4 3 or prolonging their cases-in-chief.44 Thus, the
final premise about trials is that opposing lawyers cannot object successfully to
improper persuasion techniques.
II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE TRIAL PROCESS
Professor Gold's Article indicates that many lawyers fundamentally misun-
derstand the psychology of jury behavior and the trial process. They mis-
perceive how jurors receive and process information, draw unwarranted
conclusions from the psychological literature, and make incorrect assumptions
about the extent to which psychologists are willing to assist lawyers in partisan
advocacy. Gold's Article is a good vehicle for exploring these misconceptions,
because it incorporates both his own conclusions about psychology and those of
the lawyers who write trial advocacy articles based on psychology.
Those critical of psychologist-lawyer collaboration tend to assume that ju-
rors in their natural state are either unbiased or can easily put aside their biases,
and will therefore decide cases based on the evidence. Although Gold acknowl-
edges that people tend to rely on biases in making decisions, through cognitive
35. Gold, supra note 1, at 492.
36. Gold, supra note 1, at 484.
37. Gold, supra note 1, at 485.
38. See Gold, supra note 1, at 507-08.
39. One reason that Gold may accord so little importance to objections is his belief that the
opposing lawyer "may not even be aware that covert advocacy is being employed .. " Gold, supra
note 1, at 504.
40. Gold, supra note I, at 504.
41. Gold, supra note 1, at 488-89, 495.
42. Gold, supra note I, at 487.
43. Gold, supra note 1, at 494-95.
44. Gold, supra note 1, at 497.
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devices such as heuristics 45 and knowledge structures or "schemas," 4 6 he as-
sumes that these biases affect jurors only when imposed by attorneys. This as-
sumption is inconsistent with what psychologists know about juror behavior. In
a complex task such as deciding on a verdict in a trial, cognitive biases are a
natural consequence of the decision process. They serve as a means of simplify-
ing and organizing information, and they reflect the way all persons think.
Therefore, jurors are susceptible to bias without any assistance from lawyers.
Research demonstrates various ways in which juror decisions are naturally
biased. For example, jurors place considerable weight on eyewitness testimony,
regardless of its accuracy.47 This weight is particularly problematic because one
hundred years of research has shown that eyewitness accounts often are quite
inaccurate.4 8 Jurors tend to equate eyewitness confidence with accuracy and
give more weight to witnesses who claim to be or act as if they were certain of
their observations,49 when in fact there is a weak relationship between confi-
dence and accuracy.5 0 Other examples abound. Jurors tend naturally to make
credibility decisions about witnesses and attorneys based on their social status,
style of speech, clothing, or occupation.5 1 The order in which evidence or argu-
ments are presented affects the jury's perception of the evidence.52 Jurors in
criminal cases tend to assume a defendant guilty if he has been charged with
several offenses 53 or if he has a criminal record.5 4 Biases such as these are not
45. For a general discussion of heuristics, see D. KAHNEMAN, P. SLovic & A. TVERSKY,
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982); Markus & Zajonc, The Cogni-
tive Perspective Social Psychology, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 137, 186-97 (G.
Lindzey & E. Aronson eds., 3d ed. 1985); Sherman & Corty, Cognitive Heuristics, in 1 HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL COGNITION 189 (R. Wyer & T. Srull eds. 1984).
46. See Markus & Zajonc, supra note 45, at 150-74; Rumelhart, Schemata and the Cognitive
System, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION, supra note 45, at 161; Taylor & Crocker, Sche-
matic Bases of Social Information Processing, in 1 SOCIAL COGNITION: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM
89 (E. Higgins, C. Herman & M. Zanna eds. 1981).
47. See, e.g., Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY
116, 116-119 (Dec. 1974); Wells, Lindsay & Ferguson, Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions
in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 440 (1979).
48. See E. LoFrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 1-7 (1979); H. MUENSTERBERG, ON THE WIT-
NESS STAND (1908); Penrod, Loftus & Winkler, The Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony: A Psycho-
logical Perspective, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 119, 122 (N. Kerr & R. Bray eds.
1982); Wells, The Eyewitness, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 48-57
(S. Kassin & L. Wrightsman eds. 1985).
49. See Wells & Leippe, How Do Triers of Fact Infer the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications?
Using Memory for Peripheral Detail Can Be Misleading, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 682 (1981);
Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, Effects of Expert Psychological Advice on Human Performance in
Judging the Validity of Eyewitness Testimony, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 275, 278-79 (1980).
50. See Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can We Infer Anything About
Their Relationship?, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 243, 257-58 (1980); Wells & Murray, Eyewitness Confi-
dence, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 155, 159-65 (G. Wells & E.
Loftus eds. 1984).
51. See, e.g., Conley, O'Barr & Lind, supra note 6; Mehrabian & Williams, Nonverbal Concomi-
tants of Perceived and Intended Persuasiveness, 13 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 37, 37-38
(1969); Miller, Maruyama, Beaber & Valone, Speed of Speech and Persuasion, 34 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 615, 615-17 (1976).
52. See Insko, Lind & LaTour, Persuasion, Recall, and Thoughts, 7 REPRESENTATIVE RES. IN
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 66, 77-78 (1976); Lawson, Order of Presentation as a Factor in Jury Persuasion,
56 Ky. L.J. 523 (1968).
53. See Tanford & Penrod, Biases in Trials Involving Defendants Charged with Multiple Of-
fenses, 12 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 453, 475-78 (1982).
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induced by attorneys.
A good example of lawyers misunderstanding the nature of juror bias is
Gold's treatment of the research by O'Barr and his colleagues on the effects of
different speech styles on the jury. Gold writes that lawyers induce otherwise
unbiased jurors to judge witnesses' credibility by either training those witnesses
to use powerful speech or tricking them into using powerless speech."5
O'Barr and his colleagues view their work quite differently. They discov-
ered that when lawyers do not intervene, jurors inaccurately judge the credibility
of witnesses based on the jurors' perceptions of the witnesses' social status as
indicated by the power of their speech. By publishing their research in a law
review, they hoped to help eliminate this inherent bias against witnesses who
naturally use a weaker speaking style because of their social class, but who in
fact are no less credible than other witnesses.56 By training witnesses of lower
socioeconomic status to use more powerful speech, lawyers are not misleading
the jury into incorrectly giving too much credit to their testimony, as Gold sug-
gests, but are eliminating a natural tendency to mistakenly give too little credit
to a witness because of class prejudice.
The assumption that jurors have a natural tendency to put aside their biases
and reach accurate verdicts is further undercut by other research. Psychologists
have found that jurors tend to have difficulty in consistently finding the facts and
applying the law to these facts. They often cannot understand or do not follow
the judge's instructions on the law and treatment of evidence.57 They often are
unable to disregard evidence likely to arouse their prejudices even after it is
ruled inadmissible and they are admonished not to consider it.5 8 Jurors also tend
to confuse evidence in trials that involve multiple parties, causes of action, or
offenses, using evidence admitted on one issue to resolve other issues.59 They
also tend to make legally forbidden inferences from evidence introduced for im-
peachment purposes, even in the face of instructions on proper and improper
54. See Doob & Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of § 12 of the Canada
Evidence Act Upon an Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88, 93-96 (1973); Wissler & Saks, On the Inefficacy of
Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Credibility Evidence to Decide Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 37, 43-47 (1985).
55. Gold, supra note 1, at 484-85.
56. E.g., Conley, O'Barr & Lind, supra note 6, at 1376-77.
57. For summaries of research regarding jury instructions, see A. ELWORK, B. SALES, & J.
ALFINI, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982); Elwork & Sales, Jury Instruc-
tions, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE, supra note 48, at 280; Lind, The
Psychology of Courtroom Procedure, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM, supra note 48, at
27-31.
58. See Sue, Smith & Caldwell, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Sinulated
Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 345, 351-53 (1973); Thompson, Fong &
Rosenhan, Inadmissible Evidence and Juror Verdicts, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 453,
460-62 (1981); Wissler & Saks, supra note 54, at 43-47; Wolf & Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible
Evidence and Level of Judicial Admonishment to Disregard on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 7 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 205, 216-18 (1977):
59. See Bordens & Horowitz, Information Processing in Joined and Severed Trials, 13 J. AP-
PLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 351, 366-69 (1983); Tanford & Penrod, supra note 53, at 475-78; Tanford
& Penrod, Social Inference Processes in Juror Judgments of Multiple.Offense Trials, 47 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 749, 761-64 (1984).
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uses. 60 Thus, the underlying assumption that jurors naturally reach accurate,
unbiased decisions, is belied by the empirical evidence.
A second erroneous assumption often made about juror behavior is implicit
in the title of Gold's Article, "Covert Advocacy." By arguing that jurors are
passive participants in the persuasion process, whose judgments can be easily
manipulated by attorneys without the jurors' awareness, Gold reveals a basic
misunderstanding about the cognitive processes of jurors. Professor Gold pro-
vides little documentation for this key assumption in his argument, apparently
relying primarily on work by Nisbett and his colleagues. 6 1 They speculated that
subjects in their experiments did not have access to their own mental processes;
the subjects were unaware that a particular manipulation had affected their be-
havior. Many psychologists would disagree with this interpretation. Indeed,
other research, including a reanalysis of Nisbett's data, shows that under many
conditions people do have access to their mental processes and are aware of
what has caused their behavior.6 2
Individuals often are active processors of social information rather than
passive recipients. 63 In conceptualizing the cognitive process, psychologists dis-
tinguish between two modes of information processing-automatic and con-
scious.64 Automatic processes are those that "are directly under the control of
the environment and that do not require conscious processing of any kind."' 65
The critics apparently fear that jurors can be influenced at this subconscious
level when an attorney manipulates the language, style, and demeanor of a wit-
ness' or her own appearance. However, automatic processes are limited to the
perceptual stage of processing, when information is initially taken in, and are
most likely to influence judgrients under situations of low involvement. Low
involvement also is characterized by reliance on heuristics and other simplifica-
tion strategies that require little effort. When people are highly involved in an
event, they are likely to use a "systematic" processing strategy that is character-
ized by careful evaluation of facts and arguments, rather than reliance on heuris-
60. See Tanford & Cox, Decision Processes in Civil Cases: The Impact of Impeachment Evidence
on Liability and Credibility Judgments, 2 Soc. BEHAVIOUR 165 (1987); Tanford & Cox, The Impact
of Impeachment Evidence on Individual and Group Decision Making (1987) (unpublished manu-
script) (available from authors at Purdue University Psychology Dept.).
61. Nisbett & Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes,
84 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 231 (1977); see also R. NisnETT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRAT-
EGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980) (general textbook on the subject).
62. See Smith & Miller, Limits on Perception of Cognitive Processes: A Reply to Nisbett and
Wilson, 85 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 355 (1978).
63. See Markus & Zajonc, supra note 45, at 137-41; Wyer & Srull, Category Accessibility: Some
Theoretical and Empirical Issues Concerning the Processing of Social Stimulus Information, in 1
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION, supra note 45, at 161, 163-73.
64. See Bargh, Automatic and Conscious Processing of Social Information, in 3 HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL COGNITION, supra note 45, at 1-28; Logan, Attention and Automaticity in Stroop and Prim-
ing Tasks: Theory and Data, 12 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 523 (1980); Posner & Snyder, Attention
and Cognitive Control, in INFORMATION PROCESSING AND COGNITION: THE LOYOLA SYMPOSIUM
55 (R. Solso ed. 1975); Schneider & Shiffrin, Controlled and Automatic Human Information Process-
ing: I Detection, Search and Attention, 84 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 1 (1977); Shiffrin & Schneider,
Controlled and Automatic Human Information Processing: IL Perceptual Learning, Automatic At-
tending, and a General Theory, 84 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 127 (1977).
65. Bargh, supra note 64, at 36.
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tics. 66 One certainly would expect the juror's role to be one of high involvement,
since jurors must decide the fate of human lives; thus, a juror's involvement is
more likely to involve conscious rather than automatic processing.
Even when an individual processes information automatically, he then acts
on it consciously to produce relevant judgments and behaviors. 67 If certain so-
cial (nonevidentiary) information does reach the jurors automatically, jurors will
weigh it along with other evidence, and the actual decision will result from the
conscious evaluation of all information that the jurors perceived. Thus, "there is
no evidence supporting the belief that social behavior is often, or even some-
times, automatically determined,"' 68 let alone that behavior as important as de-
ciding a verdict is ever significantly affected by unconscious impressions of the
style and demeanor of witnesses and attorneys.
It is obvious from Gold's article that lawyers have difficulty finding, under-
standing, and drawing proper conclusions from the psychological literature. A
large body of scientific literature covering matters of jury behavior, communica-
tion, and persuasion is published in psychological journals. For example, Law
and Human Behavior, a journal of the American Psychological Association's
Section on Law and Psychology, is devoted exclusively to psycholegal research
and is written in language accessible to both lawyers and psychologists. One of
the journal's express purposes is the communication of accurate information on
the psychology of trial practice to lawyers. Other scientific studies can be found
in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Journal of Applied Psychol-
ogy, and Journal of Applied Social Psychology. These journals have high stan-
dards for acceptance, require that all articles survive a peer review process, and
are likely to contain some of the best experimental work on courtroom issues.
Yet Gold cites only four such articles.69
Instead, Gold provides a valuable picture of the kind of information readily
available to the lawyer. He cites some of the important books that summarize
psycholegal research, 70 but most of his information comes from "articles re-
cently published in trial advocacyjournals.'' 71 Most such secondary articles are
written by lawyers or "consultants," not by the scientists who conducted the
66. See Chaiken, Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of Source Ver-
sus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 752 (1980).
67. See Bargh, supra note 64, at 14-28.
68. Bargh, supra note 64, at 36.
69. See Gold, supra note 1, at 486 n.24, 488 n.41, 490 n.51.
70. Gold cites the following works: G. BERMANT, C. NEMETH & N. VIDMAR, PSYCHOLOGY
AND THE LAW (1976); R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983); 1.
HOROWITZ & T. WILLGING, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LAW: INTEGRATIONS AND APPLICATIONS
(1984); S. KASSIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE
(1985); N. KERR & R. BRAY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM (1982); P. LiPsinr & B.
SALES, NEW DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLEGAL RESEARCH (1980); E. LoFrus, supra note 48; W.
O'BARR, supra note 6; M. SAKS & R. HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT (1978); B. SALES,
THE TRIAL PROCESS (1981); R. SIMON, THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA (1975); R. SIMON, THE
JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1980); J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUS-
TICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975); L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 6.
71. Gold, supra note 1, at 483 (emphasis added). Gold cites 24 articles from journals that have
the goal of promoting advocacy techniques such as Litigation, Trial, and Trial Diplomacy Journal.
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experiments. 7 2 Relying primarily on these articles causes two problems. First,
only a portion of the body of psychological knowledge about courtroom issues is
being communicated. Second, some misinformation is being communicated.
Many of these articles are unscientific, reach unsupportable conclusions, and
would not be considered acceptable to psychologists. Of the fourteen articles
Gold calls the "most important... published in the last decade,"'7 3 only two
were published in professional psychological journals, 74 only about half would
even be remotely acceptable to a reputable psychological journal, and only one
set of articles-the O'Barr language studies-would be considered by psycholo-
gists as among the "most important" research.
75
Part of the problem is a lack of critical thinking. Lawyers like Gold and
those who write about psychology for the advocacy journals 76 sometimes appear
to lack the ability to distinguish between scientific research and what could be
called "pop psychology." Pop psychology is typified by the self-help paperback
that one can select in the psychology section of a commercial bookstore. Thus,
in the Colley articles that Gold considers among the "most important," one
finds the careful experimental research of Hovland, Janis, and Kelley77 cited
along with I'm O.K., You're O.K 78 The difference between them is obvious: the
former is supported by sound empirical data gathered from controlled scientific
experiments; the latter is simply the intuitive theorizing of someone who hap-
pens to hold a doctorate. Advice taken from such nonscientific sources is proba-
bly no better, and may be worse, than lawyers' own intuitive theories about how
to persuade jurors.
One major problem to which lawyers seem susceptible concerns the gener-
alization of the results of psychological experiments. It is erroneous to assume
that because a manipulation has an effect on subjects in the laboratory, it will
have the same effect on jurors in the courtroom. Perhaps the most cogent exam-
ple is the research by Asch used repeatedly to support the importance of first
impressions in the courtroom. 79 Asch found that subjects evaluated an individ-
ual more favorably when described by a list of traits starting with the most
favorable (intelligent, industrious, impulsive, critical, stubborn, envious) than
when described by the same list beginning with the least favorable traits (envi-
72. Cf. Linz & Penrod, Increasing Attorney Persuasiveness in the Courtroom, 8 LAW & PSY-
CHOLOGY REV. 1 (1984) (summary article written by psychologists who do extensive jury simulation
research).
73. Gold, supra note I, at 482 n.7.
74. Kerr, Beautiful and Blameless: Effects of Victim Attractiveness and Responsibility on Mock
Jurors' Verdicts, 4 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 479 (1978); Kulka & Kessler, Is Jus-
tice Really Blind?-The Influence of Litigant Physical Attractiveness on Juridical Judgment, 8 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 366 (1978).
75. From among O'Barr's numerous publications, Gold relied on those published in legal
rather than psychological journals. See Gold, supra note 1, at 484 n.14.
76. E.g., Colley, Style, Structure and Semantics, TRIAL, July 1983, at 86; Colley, First Impres-
sions, LITIGATION, Summer 1977, at 8.
77. C. HOVLAND, I. JANIS, & H. KELLEY, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION (1953).
78. T. HARRIS, I'M O.K., YOU'RE O.K. (1967).
79. See, e.g., Parker, Applied Psychology in Trial Practice, 7 DEF. L.J. 33, 36 (1960).
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ous, stubborn, critical, impulsive, industrious, intelligent). 80 It is a rather large
inferential leap to conclude from this study that jurors exposed to the complexi-
ties of a trial that lasts days or even weeks will be most strongly influenced by
the first information they hear.
The extent to which empirical research on juror decision making is applica-
ble to actual trials is a topic of great interest and controversy among social scien-
tists. 8 1 The bulk of the experimental work uses "jury simulation" techniques in
which participants are asked to play the role of jurors and make individual deci-
sions about a hypothetical defendant on trial. This research has been criticized
on several grounds as not adequately reflecting actual trials. First, much of the
research uses college student subjects who are not attitudinally or demographi-
cally representative of the juror population. Studies have shown that younger
adults may have more weak and changeable attitudes than older adults,8 2 and
therefore might be more susceptible to attorney persuasion tactics. Second, the
stimulus materials often do not approximate an actual trial. Psychologists have
used everything from short written case summaries to videotaped trial reenact-
ments, but these experimental types all share a common characteristic: they are
shorter and simpler than actual trials.8 3 The effect of a nonevidentiary manipu-
lation is likely to be larger in magnitude when subjects have less evidence to
consider. Third, decisions of experimental jurors usually have no real conse-
quences for a defendant on trial. Wilson and Donnerstein demonstrated that
manipulations of defendant and victim status characteristics had different effects
when subjects thought there were consequences than when they thought there
were none.84 Fourth, only a handful of the many experiments have included
group deliberations in their procedures; most studies ask for individual, written
decisions. Some research suggests that the effects of extralegal or nonevidentiary
biases may be eliminated during deliberation, 85 although the effects of certain
80. Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 258
(1946).
81. See Bray & Kerr, Methodological Considerations in the Study of the Psychology of the Court-
room, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM, supra note 48, at 287; Konecni & Ebbesen, Exter-
nal Validity of Research in Legal Psychology, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39 (1979); Konecni &
Ebbesen, Social Psychology and the Law: The Choice of Research Problems, Settings, and Methodol-
ogy, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 27 (V. Konecni &
E. Ebbesen eds. 1982); Lind & Walker, Theory Testing, Theory Development, and Laboratory Re-
search on Legal Issues, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 5 (1979); Suggs, The Use of Psychological Research
By the Judiciary: Do the Courts Adequately Assess the Validity of the Research?, 3 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 135 (1979); Weiten & Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm: The
Case of Defendant Characteristics, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 71 (1979).
82. Glenn, Values, Attitudes, and Beliefs, in CONSTANCY AND CHANGE IN HUMAN DEVELOP-
MENT 596 (0. Brim, Jr. & J. Kagan eds. 1980); Sears, Life-Style Effects on Attitude Change, Espe-
cially Among the Elderly, in AGING: SOCIAL CHANGE 183 (S. Kiesler, J. Morgan & V.
Oppenheimer eds. 1981); Sears, College Sophomores in the Laboratory: Influence of a Narrow Data
Base on Social Psychology's View of Human Nature, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 515
(1986).
83. "[A] concession," said Oliver Wendell Holmes, "to the shortness of life." Reeve v. Den-
nett, 145 Mass. 23, 28, 11 N.E. 938, 943 (1887).
84. Wilson & Donnerstein, Guilty or Not Guilty? A Look at the "Simulated"Jury Paradigm, 7
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 175 (1977).
85. E.g., Kaplan & Miller, Reducing the Effects of Juror Bias, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 1443 (1978).
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evidentiary biases may be exacerbated. 86 In either case, the effect of a manipula-
tion on actual jurors cannot be predicted without considering the deliberation
process. Fifth, many of the studies assess impact not in terms of what verdict a
person would reach, but along other lines such as how subjects perceive a wit-
ness's credibility.
87
In response to these criticisms, researchers recently have attempted to in-
crease the realism of their experiments through the use of nonstudent subjects,
more realistic materials and procedures, and field experimental techniques.
Thus, the generalization of some current research findings may be quite appro-
priate.8 8 However, most of the research summarized in the trial advocacy
materials available to lawyers was conducted in the old way-in laboratory set-
tings quite different from the courtroom.89 Findings from such research would
be considered low in generalizability. The work on attitudes and persuasion,
nonverbal communication, and impression formation that forms the basis of
many suggestions concerning attorney tactics is particularly lacking in this re-
spect. Most of the research did not even involve a simulated jury decision
task.90
Another problem in generalizing the research is that most of it does not
reveal the effect an extralegal factor would have on a juror's decision relative to
the effect of other evidence. Just because scientists, by carefully controlling the
variables, can demonstrate that nonevidentiary factors such as style, demeanor,
and speech affect juror behavior, it does not necessarily follow that the effect will
be significant in a real trial. Lawyers tend to exaggerate the probable effect such
factors will have, ignoring that juror decision making is affected mostly by the
strength of the evidence. Most experiments examining the influence of extra-
legal factors hold evidentiary strength constant while manipulating variables of
interest. In addition, an attempt often is made to keep the evidence weak or
ambiguous in experiments to assure maximum sensitivity to the manipulation's
effect. Studies that have manipulated evidentiary strength demonstrate that ex-
tralegal factors exert their greatest impact when the remaining trial evidence is
weak or ambiguous, and may have little or no effect when evidence is strong.9 1
In addition, the relative impact of extralegal factors may be small compared to
86. See Hans & Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberations of Simu-
lated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235, 242-43 (1976) (evidence of prior convictions did not affect individ-
ual decisions but strongly affected group verdicts).
87. E.g., Asch, supra note 80, at 258; Conley, O'Barr & Lind, supra note 6, at 1375-77.
88. See sources cited supra note 81.
89. Gold cites Sannito, Nonverbal Communication in the Courtroom, TRIAL DIPL. J., Summer
1983, at 22, who cites sources such as 3 S. FREUD, Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria, in
COLLECTED PAPERS (1959); A. MEHRABIAN, NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION (1972); Hess, Seltzer
& Shlien, Pupil Response of Hetero- and Homosexual Males to Pictures of Men and Women: A Pilot
Study, 70 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 165 (1965).
90. E.g., Albert & Dabbs, Physical Distance and Persuasion, 15 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY-
CHOLOGY 265 (1970); Hovland & Mandell, An Experimental Comparison of Conclusion-Drawing by
the Communicator and by the Audience, 47 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 581 (1952).
91. Calder, Insko & Yandell, The Relation of Cognitive and Memorial Processes to Persuasion in
a Simulated Jury Trial, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 62 (1974); Kerr & Sawyers, Independence
of Multiple Verdicts Within a Trial By Mock Jurors, 10 REPRESENTATIvE REs. IN SOC. PSYCHOL-
OGY 16 (1979); Sue, Smith & Caldwell, supra note 58, at 345; Crowley & Tanford, Stereotyping in
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the impact of evidentiary factors.92
Even if it were possible for a lawyer, with the aid of a psychologist, to
manipulate a jury into returning an unwarranted verdict, the lawyer first would
need to find a psychologist willing to participate in such an endeavor. Lawyers
are perhaps so socialized into an adversarial world view that they simply take for
granted that psychologists would agree to become coconspirators in an attempt
to deceive jurors. This assumption is unrealistic. Most social scientists are em-
ployed, not as full-time consultants in the adversarial legal system, but in an
academic community that values objectivity and truth.93 Although many law-
yers would have few qualms about trying to entice a jury into acquitting a guilty
client, few psychologists are likely to be willing to go that far. Psychologists are
undoubtedly available to help attorneys present their evidence effectively, but
are not likely to deviate radically from their professional socialization and know-
ingly help attorneys try to circumvent evidence. 94
The appropriate and ethical role for psychologists in the legal arena is of
concern to psychologists as well as lawyers. 95 The basic question is whether the
psychologist's primary role as a seeker of knowledge and impartial educator ever
permits a scientist to become an advocate, especially for a party who hopes to
win an undeserved verdict. 96 Most psychologists' primary goals are to dissemi-
nate accurate knowledge of psychology to the public97 and maintain the scien-
the Courtroom: The Effects of Defendant Typicality on Judgments and Memory (1987) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (available from authors at Purdue University Psychology Dept.).
92. See Kaplan & Kemmerick, Juror Judgment as Information Integration: Combining Eviden-
tial and Nonevidential Information, 30 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 493 (1974).
93. Of course, there is no shortage of entrepreneurial "psychological consultants" available for
hire. Anyone can hold him or herself out as a psychological consultant, whether or not that person
holds a Ph.D. from a reputable university and regardless of whether that person has had any real
training in the experimental method. We assume that a lawyer seeks competent psychological assist-
ance, and does not merely try to impress a client or otherwise throw away money. Cf McConahay,
Mullin & Frederick, The Uses of Social Science in Trials with Political and Racial Overtones: The
Trial of Joan Little, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 214 (1977) (attorney hired psychic to aid in
jury selection by advising on aura, karma, and psychic vibrations).
94. This discussion has drawn guffaws from several lawyers who have seen it. They assert that
they could easily buy Harvard psychologists to do anything the lawyers wanted. However, psychol-
ogists who saw the draft deny they are so easily bought and sold. The psychologists generally agreed
they would not help a lawyer try to trick or deceive a jury into acquitting a guilty defendant,
although there might be some in the profession who would be willing to do so. One reason lawyers
may be so quick to assume psychologists are available for even the most extreme kinds of deception
is a failure to distinguish between psychologists and the psychotherapists who testify about the in-
sanity defense. See, e.g., Tybor, Dallas'Doctor of Doom, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 24, 1980, at I (describing
psychotherapist known as "Dr. Death" because he had testified in over 50 death penalty cases,
sometimes without even examining the defendant, that in his opinion the defendant had no regard
for human life, was a remorseless sociopath, and would continue his violent behavior if allowed to
live).
95. For example, a recent issue of Law and Human Behavior was devoted to this ethical debate
as it pertains to expert psychological testimony on eyewitness performance. See The Experimental
Psychologist in Court: The Ethics of Expert Testimony, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1986).
96. See Goldman, Cognitive Psychologists as Expert Witnesses: A Problem in Professional Eth-
ics, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29 (1986); Hastie, Notes on the Psychologist Expert Witness, 10 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 79 (1986); Loftus, Experimental Psychologist as Advocate or Impartial Educator, 10
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 63 (1986).
97. See Buckhout, Personal Values and Expert Testimony, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 127, 140-
41 (1986).
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tific integrity of their profession. 98 Psychologists who have become involved in
psycholegal research generally want to prevent miscarriages of justice, not con-
tribute to them. They seek to improve the reliability of the legal system, not to
undermine it. These concerns restrict how far psychologists will be willing to go
in pursuit of an advocacy goal.99
Although some psychologists argue that they should never become involved
in litigation in the first place, most agree that if they do, they must avoid decep-
tion, distortion, and half-truths. The ethical guidelines of the American Psycho-
logical Association require, among other things, objectivity in research and full
disclosure of the limitations of data and research techniques. Thus, psycholo-
gists who conduct special purpose studies should not allow lawyers to dictate the
research design to produce a desired outcome, but should retain their objectivity
and use the most reliaple methodology. ° ° Psychologists who present psycho-
logical information to the public, either by writing articles, as consultants, or as
witnesses, must "base their statements on scientifically acceptable psychological
findings and techniques with full recognition of the limits and uncertainties of
such evidence," 10' and provide such information "fairly and accurately, avoid-
ing misrepresentation through sensationalism, exaggeration or superficiality."' 10 2
The ethical limits of participation in partisan advocacy have been debated
by prominent psychologists. Much of the debate has concerned psychologists as
expert witnesses. In this context, a consensus exists that because the primary
role of science is to impart knowledge, the expert should not participate in the
presentation of a distorted view of the results of research either directly or
through the half-truth of selecting nonrepresentative data. 10 3 Psychologists dis-
agree whether as experts they must disclose all contradictory findings, even
those that probably are inaccurate, 104 or should present only the best and sound-
est research.10 5 Most agree, however, that psychologists should not testify about
psychological phenomena unless they are confident about their existence based
98. See McCloskey & Egeth, A Time to Speak, or a Time to Keep Silence?, 38 AM. PsYCHOLo-
GIST 573, 574 (1983); Wells, Expert Psychological Testimony: Empirical and Conceptual Analyses of
Effects, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 83, 92-93 (1986).
99. But see Loftus, Trials of an Expert Witness, NEWSWEEK, June 29, 1987, at 10 (justifying
author's decision not to provide expert testimony concerning the problems of eyewitness identifica-
tion in a trial of an alleged Nazi because she wished to see him convicted).
100. See Loftus, supra note 96, at 67-70.
101. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC., ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS 634-35
(1981).
102. Id. at 635. The concern about potential misrepresentation and superficiality has led some
psychologists to suggest that scientists should never state generalized conclusions, however well-
based in specific research findings. See Pachella, Personal Values and the Value of Expert Testimony,
10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 145 (1986). Most, however, contend that generalizations may be appro-
priate if all positive and negative factors are explained. See Hastie, Notes on the Psychologist Expert
Witness, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 79, 81 (1986).
103. See Loftus, supra note 96, at 66-67.
104. Goldman, supra note 96, at 34.
105. Yarmey, Ethical Responsibilities Governing the Statements Experimental Psychologists Make
in Expert Testimony, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 101, 112 (1986). But cf. Wolfgang, The Social
Scientist in Court, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 243-47 (1974) (arguing that it is ethical for a
psychologist to present only the research that supports a party's position).
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on a body of research rather than on one or two tentative studies. 106
The logic of this debate carries over to situations in which a psychologist is
considering giving advice on how to improve a lawyer's trial performance. Ethi-
cal psychologists will require a certain quality and quantity of data before sug-
gesting, either personally or by writing articles, that the lawyer can improve her
trial performance.107 They will not recommend that an attorney act on a psy-
chological premise unless a body of reliable research clearly supports a particu-
lar conclusion, 10 8 and that conclusion is consistent with general theories of
human behavior extending beyond the courtroom.10 9 Issues of external validity
further limit the applicability of some research to courtroom settings.110 Much
of the research referred to in Gold's Article that seems to suggest ways in which
attorneys can deceive jurors by varying their behavior and demeanor are isolated
studies that have not been replicated, are inconsistent with general psychological
theory, or were conducted under conditions very dissimilar to trials. No quali-
fied psychologist hired as a consultant would recommend that attorneys act on
such studies.
How will this overall concern for truth, replication, and professional ethics
affect the specific issue raised by Professor Gold? Will most psychologists agree
to participate in an effort to covertly deceive jurors into returning a verdict con-
trary to the facts? First, because little reliable scientific evidence exists that this
goal is at all possible, it is unlikely that qualified psychologists would pretend
they could help lawyers accomplish such deception just to make extra money.
Second, if a psychologist perceived that his participation would have a deleteri-
ous effect on jurors by misleading them from the truth or causing them to misin-
terpret or misapply the information in some way, that psychologist would not be
likely to participate. On this issue, agreement is virtually unanimous among
psychologists: it is inconsistent with their role as scientists to facilitate deception
or unnecessary harm. Several researchers emphasize that the purpose of collab-
oration with lawyers is to allow jurors to make better, more informed, and more
rational judgments. I ' Psychologists are advised to consider the possible conse-
quences of their research on jurors in deciding whether and how to provide in-
formation.' 12 In addition, psychologists must consider whether the data will be
106. See Yarmey, supra note 105, at 109-11. This empirical approach dovetails with the require-
ment of evidence law that expert testimony is admissible only if generally accepted as true within the
appropriate scientific community. For example, a sufficiently large body of knowledge has accumu-
lated on the various factors that affect eyewitness performance. See Monahan & Loftus, The Psy-
chology of Law, 33 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 441, 450 (1982). But cf. Konecni & Ebbesen,
Courtroom Testimony by Psychologists on Eyewitness Identification Issues: Critical Notes and Reflec-
tions, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 117, 123 (1986) (consensus among scientists not equivalent to being
correct).
107. See Konecni & Ebbesen, supra note 106, at 121; Lempert, Social Sciences in Court: On
"Eyewitness Experts" and Other Issues, 10 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 167, 175-79 (1986); Yarmey, supra
note 105, at 112.
108. Yarmey, supra note 105, at 101-02.
109. See Lempert, supra note 107, at 168-70; Yarmey, supra note 105, at 108-09.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 79-92.
111. Eg., Bersoff, Psychologists and the Judicial System: Broader Perspectives, 10 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 151, 152-53, 159-60 (1986); Goldman, supra note 96, at 33-34; Hastie, supra note 96, at 81.
112. Goldman, supra note 96, at 29-30.
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used by lawyers in an undistorted fashion. Thus, any attempt by attorneys to
use research findings to lead jurors away from "truth" is likely to be met with
resistance rather than cooperation from social scientists.
Some psychologists, however, undoubtedly will become "hired guns" who
work for lawyers regardless of the merits of their cases. Several of the articles
used to support Gold's argument are written by consultants whose livelihoods
depend on this partisan work. Is there really anything to fear from a few such
individuals? We think not, for several reasons. First, if they go so far as to
misrepresent research to support one side or another, they are likely to be dis-
covered and exposed by ethical members of the psychological profession.11 3
Second, many ethical members of the legal profession will not be willing to hire
them to deliberately deceive jurors. Third, to the extent that they claim to be
able to turn a bad case on the facts into a winner through psychological ploys,
these consultants are greatly exaggerating their powers. Although lawyers, espe-
cially those with desperate cases, will occasionally fall prey to such snake-oil
salesmen, 1 4 it is unlikely they will be able to successfully deceive jurors.
Obviously, competent psychological consultants are readily available for a
host of purposes that fall short of outright deception of jurors. Reputable psy-
chologists undoubtedly will be willing to help a lawyer identify and challenge
biased jurors, tutor witnesses, and structure arguments. In close cases, if such
advice is sought only by one side, psychology may indeed play some role in the
outcome. It is always possible that one side will outperform the other in part
because of disparity in resources, including legal talent. This aspect of the prob-
lem is hardly unique to the use of psychology by lawyers, but is inherent in the
adversary structure of trials.
III. THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE TRIAL PROCESS
Critics who fear that psychologist-lawyer collaboration will damage the le-
gitimacy of the American trial process tend to arrive at their conclusions in part
by mischaracterizing the nature of the existing trial system. Implicit in their
attack are three main premises concerning trials. The first is empirical. They
utilize a paradigm in which trials present the jury with a single, unambiguous
version of "the truth," from which a lawyer will try to divert the jury by using
persuasion. The second is jurisprudential. The critics posit that truth seeking is
113. See Buckhout, supra note 97, at 142; Loftus, supra note 96, at 77.
114. Lawyers can better understand the psychology of the courtroom, avoid errors of interpreta-
tion, and make intelligent choices about consultants by following several suggestions. Lawyers
should be suspicious of articles written by persons who have no university affiliation and are pub-
lished in trial advocacy journals or popular paperbacks. More reliable sources of information are
found in the references cited supra note 70. Second, lawyers must be cautious about drawing genera-
lized conclusions, especially if an experiment was conducted in an unrealistic laboratory setting.
Third, lawyers should remember that the strength of the evidence is likely to affect jurors more
strongly than nonevidentiary factors. Fourth, lawyers should give jurors credit for having the
mental capability to weigh evidentiary and nonevidentiary factors carefully and consciously. Fifth,
lawyers must be wary of consultants who make exaggerated claims that they can influence jurors
covertly or turn a loser into a winner. If psychological consultants seem too good to be true, they
probably are.
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the only legitimate guiding principle of trials, so it is improper for lawyers with
weak cases to try to persuade juries to decide contrary to the apparent weight of
the evidence. The third is doctrinal. They assume existing legal rules of trial
procedure do not adequately prevent lawyers from defrauding jurors in an effort
to win an undeserved verdict.
This picture of the trial process is misleading. The underlying empirical
assumption is inaccurate in two respects. Some significant percentage of cases
going to trial will involve two or more plausible versions of uncertain facts,
rather than one set of certain facts. Also, most trials will involve efforts by both
lawyers to persuade the jury, usually in a manner consistent with the evidence.
The underlying jurisprudential assumption also is wrong. Although truth seek-
ing is undoubtedly one of the goals of a trial, it is not the sole guiding principle
of trial jurisprudence. Equally fundamental is the principle of partisan adver-
sariness. Finally, the underlying doctrinal assumption is erroneous. Existing
legal rules of trial procedure adequately prevent most attempts by lawyers to
subvert rational decision making or induce jurors to use some basis other than
the evidence for their decision.
A. An Empirical Model of Trials
The attack on psychologist-lawyer collaboration is based in part on an em-
pirical premise about trials: persuasion is used by the lawyer with the weaker
case to divert the jury away from the facts. This assumes that in most cases the
evidence is clear and consistent rather than conflicting, and that only the lawyer
representing the weaker side will use persuasion to divert the jury away from
those facts. Both assertions seem dubious. Many cases will not present only a
single clear set of facts from which the jury can be diverted. Even in cases in
which the evidence does predominate in favor of one side, there will not only be
a lawyer trying to distract the jury, but also another lawyer using the same kinds
of techniques to persuade the jury to follow the evidence.
Although one of the goals of a trial may be to reconstruct historical fact,
the reality is that human memory is notoriously unreliable. 15 As witnesses with
faulty memories, biases, and personal interests in the outcome try to reconstruct
an event, it is likely that conflicting versions of what happened will emerge as
often as a single consistent picture. Professor Gold himself suggests at one point
that the "close cases" are the ones likely to go to trial. 1 6 This is an empirical
assumption shared by most other legal scholars. 1' 7 Kalven and Zeisel's empiri-
cal study of the American jury found that many cases involved conflicting evi-
115. See E. LoFrus, supra note 48, at 20-109; L. TAYLOR, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
(1982); A. YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).
116. Gold, supra note 1, at 507. This suggestion is somewhat inconsistent with Gold's fear that
attorneys will divert jurors away from the facts in cases in which the facts are clear. In close cases
the jury justifiably could decide in favor of either side, so fears of attorney persuasion resulting in
miscarriages of justice are misplaced.
117. See, e.g., R. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS xi (1954) (trial is a competition of
inconsistent versions of facts); Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Accept-
ability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1369-72 (1985) (giving case to jury recognizes that there
is evidence on both sides; if facts were clear, judge would decide case on directed verdict). But see
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dence that provided no clear picture of the events that had transpired.' 1 8 More
recent empirical studies have confirmed this finding.1 19
Additional evidence that not all cases involve one set of clear facts comes
from appellate opinions. To find reversible error, appellate judges usually must
determine whether the error could reasonably have had an effect on the out-
come. When the facts are clear enough that any reasonable jury would have
reached a particular result, errors are harmless. 120 Yet, in only about twenty-
five percent of cases in which the appellate courts find errors are those errors
determined to be harmless. It is more likely that appellate judges, after reviewing
the record, will determine that the case was relatively close on the facts. Thus,
the jury's verdict might have been affected, and the judge will order a new trial
despite the costs.121 In many of these cases, the appellate courts made it clear
that the facts were in conflict and both sides had presented credible evidence. 122
Such cases do not involve only a single set of certain facts from which the jury
can be diverted, and the jury would be justified in returning a verdict for either
side.
The other part of the empirical premise is that persuasion takes place in
only one direction-away from the facts. Gold's paradigm is a trial in which
one lawyer exerts maximum influence on the jury, and the opposing lawyer does
nothing. For example, he worries that psychologist-lawyer collaboration will
enable one side "to select [a] favorably biased jury,"' 123 or use O'Barr's work 24
to boost the credibility of their witnesses and reduce the credibility of the oppo-
nent's witnesses. 125 This is not a useful model of the trial process. It seems
.obvious that an opposing attorney would not sit idly by while her opponent
conducted the entire trial as he saw fit. This adversarial structure provides rea-
M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 49 (1980) (most criminal defendants are in fact guilty and facts
prove it).
118. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 134 (1971). According to Table 32,
judges evaluated 43% of the criminal cases they heard as being closely balanced on the evidence.
119. P. DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL 31 (1984); L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 6, at 17-19, 203-04.
120. See generally Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REv. 988 (1973) (thor-
ough discussion of harmless error doctrine).
121. These conclusions are based on a random sample of 700 cases from all 50 states and federal
circuits in which the courts reviewed allegations of legal error in the way closing argument was
conducted. In 503 cases, the courts determined that a legal error had occurred. In 163 of those
cases (32%), the judgments were reversed. In 126 cases (25%), the error was held harmless. In 112
cases (22%), the appellant had defaulted on the claim by failing to properly object and preserve it for
the record. In 79 cases (16%), the error had been cured by subsequent action during trial. In 39
cases (8%), the error was found to have been invited. Some cases gave more than one reason for
affirming. A list of the cases is available from Alexander Tanford.
122. See, e.g., Powell v. United States, 455 A.2d 405, 411 (D.C. 1982) (close case); People v.
Blackman, 88 A.D.2d 620, 450 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (1982) (close factual issue).
123. Gold, supra note 1, at 492; see also Etzioni, Creating an Imbalance, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974,
at 28 (prominent social scientist criticizing scientific jury selection). Fear of jury stacking obviously
assumes that one side uses scientific assistance and the other side does nothing, an unrealistic as-
sumption. Such fears also are based on the assumption that attorneys have the power to select
jurors, which they do not. The attorneys' only power is to unselect-to prevent a potentially biased
juror from being seated. See Tanford, An Introduction to Trial Law, 51 Mo. L. REV. 623, 628-38
(1986). A "favorably-biased" juror cannot be selected to sit, and is likely to be removed by the other
side.
124. See Conley, O'Barr & Lind, supra note 6, at 1375.
125. Gold, supra note 1, at 485.
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sonable guarantees that in the critics' worst-case scenario-a desperate lawyer
using psychology to try to distract the jury from the evidence-another lawyer
will be attempting the far easier task of persuading the jury to follow the evi-
dence. Although there is obviously some danger that in an occasional trial one
lawyer will significantly outperform the other and thereby affect the outcome,
this danger hardly seems unique to lawyers using scientific knowledge.12 6 Its
potential negative effect is offset by the tendency of jurors to rely on evidence
regardless of what the lawyers do.
127
B. The Jurisprudence of Trials
The attack on psychologist-lawyer collaboration is based in part on the ju-
risprudential premise that truth seeking is the only legitimate guiding principle
of trials. Therefore, the only proper role for the attorney is to facilitate that
search for truth; it is wrong for her to obstruct the truth-seeking process. As a
statement of the jurisprudence of trials, this premise is simplistic and wrong. 128
An equally important guiding principle is that the process is adversarial. All
litigants are entitled to partisan advocates who will present their proofs and ar-
gue their positions regardless of the apparent strength of the evidence. It is just
as important functionally and philosophically to maintain this adversary struc-
ture as it is to strive to determine the truth, and the adversariness principle has
had as much of an effect as truth seeking on the development of trial law.
The debate over the guiding principles of trials and the proper role for at-
torneys is not new. A few scholars agree with Gold that truth seeking is either
the sole or the most important function of the trial, so that lawyers should be
limited to assisting that goal and criticized when they diverge from it. 129 A few
assert radically opposite theories, arguing that trials are not searches for truth at
all, but instead are primarily or exclusively games' 30 or tools for social
engineering. 13
126. See Zeisel & Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Ex-
periment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 517-18 (1978) (studying jury selection in
12 trials and concluding that in one the performance of the two lawyers was so disproportionate that
it probably affected the verdict).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
128. As a statement of a utopian ideal, we are less certain that it is incorrect, although the
evidence is considerable that overly zealous truth seeking leads to an unacceptable sacrifice of indi-
vidual rights. See infra text accompanying notes 134-35. However, meaningful jurisprudence must
be rooted in reality to some extent.
129. See Park, The Hearsay Rule and the Stability of Verdicts: A Response to Professor Nesson,
70 MINN. L. REV. 1057 (1986) (criticizing Nesson for suggesting that rules of trial procedure result
from a desire to promote public acceptance of verdicts rather than a desire for verdict accuracy);
Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & SOC.
REV. 123, 125 (1980-81) (a trial may indeed be more than a search for the truth in a given matter,
but surely it is not less; no evidence that symbolic functions are important). See generally sources
cited supra note 2 (criticizing trial practice generally for ignoring truth).
130. See Pulaski, Criminal Trials: "A Search for Truth" or Something Else?, 16 CRIM. L. BULL.
41, 44-45 (1980) (trials are not conducted to find out what happened-police, prosecutor and defense
attorney all probably know what happened-but as a game to persuade the community that proof is
strong enough to justify punishment.).
131. See Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and
Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 437 (1980); see also L. WRIGHTSMAN,
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Most scholars, however, reject the notion that the jurisprudence of trials is
simple and unidimensional. Trials do not function solely as searches for truth,
games, or any other single purpose. Although ascertaining the truth is impor-
tant,13 2 it is not the only principle by which trials are conducted. Even most of
those who champion truth seeking as the sole legitimate function of trials readily
concede they are not describing the trial process as it exists, but as they wish it
were. 133 The scholarly consensus is that the adversarial process by which results
are reached is just as important as the accuracy of those results. For one thing,
trials serve a symbolic, or legitimating, function. It is essential that both the
present and future disputants perceive that the decision making process is a fair
one; otherwise, disputes may be settled in the streets rather than in the courts. 134
The adversarial structure reassures litigants that they will be fully heard before
anyone deprives them of liberty or property. Beyond that, some scholars argue
that the process must not only be perceived as fair, but must in fact be fair. The
adversary structure fills this need by allowing the decision maker to remain neu-
tral and avoid the natural human tendency to jump quickly to conclusions
through heuristic reasoning.135
The principle of adversariness is an important part of the jurisprudence of
appellate judges as well as scholars. It is apparent from an examination of ap-
pellate cases concerning trial procedure that judges try to maintain the adver-
sarial structure of trials. Courts repeatedly have stated that "a fair trial is one in
which evidence [is] subject to adversarial testing," 136 and that the adversarial
procedures are "so important" that they are essential to the "ultimate integrity"
of the process.137 For example, all courts have held that the right to make a
partisan, even illogical, argument by employing oratorical and rhetorical devices
that could distract the jury from the facts,1 38 is essential to a fair trial. It has
supra note 6, at 205-06 (trials are rituals in which perception of truth seeking is more important than
real truth seeking).
132. But see Brilmayer, Wobble, or the Death of Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 375 (1986)
(concluding from an examination of appellate review that overall there is a lack of interest whether
the result was correct; only concern about whether procedures were followed); Markus, A Theory of
TrialAdvocacy, 56 TUL. L. REV. 95, 98-99 (1981) (not possible to reconstruct truth several months
or years after an event).
133. Eg., M. FRANKEL, supra note 117, at 11-12, 89 (criticizing trial process as it exists because
its central theory is a fighting or sporting theory, and adversarial premise has never really been
questioned).
134. Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts'
Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. L.J. 185, 200-08 (1983) (must command community respect for fair-
ness of process); Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 372-81
(1978) (adversary presentation substitutes peaceful for violent means of settling disputes); Leonard,
The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1, 2-3, 32 (1986) (trial serves vital legitimating function by giving interested parties
their day in court); Nesson, supra note 117, at 1360, 1368-69 (trial procedure rules result from desire
to promote public acceptance of verdicts); Pulaski, supra note 130, at 47 (appearance of fairness
important); Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial Trials,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 241 (1966) (one of the goals served by trials is "tranquilizing disputants").
135. Fuller & Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J.
1159, 1160 (1958); Fuller, supra note 134, at 382-85. For a discussion of heuristic reasoning, see
sources cited supra note 45.
136. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
137. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980).
138. See, eg., Powell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 598 S.W.2d 449, 450 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (court
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been held to be a constitutional right that cannot be curtailed even when the
evidence against that position is overwhelming.' 39 Appellate judges also indi-
rectly demonstrate how strongly they believe in this sporting aspect of trials by
the frequency with which they use analogies to sports to explain legal rules. For
example, one of the most often repeated phrases in appellate opinions concern-
ing proper trial procedure is that an attorney "may strike hard blows but is not
at liberty to strike foul ones."' 140
The influence of this adversariness principle is also evident in the develop-
ment of many of the legal doctrines of trial procedure. Several distinctive rules
of trial procedure have emerged that tend to frustrate the goal of truth seeking
while promoting other values, including adversariness. One is the doctrine of
retaliation, or invited error. It permits one side to respond to an improper argu-
ment by making its own improper argument rather than by objecting. For ex-
ample, if a plaintiff were to argue that a large verdict should be returned based
on defendant's wealth rather than on the merits, it usually would be reversible
error for a court to permit this argument."'' But if the plaintiff makes the argu-
ment in retaliation for an equally impermissible argument by the defendant that
the jury should return a small verdict based on the absence of insurance cover-
age rather than on the merits, it is not error, despite the fact that the jury is now
more likely to believe their decision should be based on ability to pay rather than
on the evidence. The two errors are considered "offsetting fouls." Under this
doctrine, courts have even affirmed verdicts that were likely to have been af-
fected by racial prejudice 142 or by irrelevant evidence from other cases.143
A second such doctrine that shows the influence of adversariness is proce-
dural default. Under the rules concerning objection procedures, judges have no
obligation to enforce the rules of evidence and trial law on their own. For exam-
ple, rules designed to facilitate reliable truth seeking by excluding hearsay and
rumor, restricting evidence of bad character and criminal activity, and forbid-
ding evidence about the relative wealth of the parties, will be enforced or not
depending on whether the attorneys object. The parties bear the responsibility
for initiating objections, putting them in the proper form, and making all the
appropriate supplemental motions needed to enforce a favorable ruling. If the
attorney fails to comply with all the procedural requirements, the appellate
held that a display emphasizing only certain jury instructions was not prejudicial); Thorsen v. City
of Chicago, 74 Ill. App. 3d 98, 104-05, 392 N.E.2d 716, 721 (1979) (court recognized that "partisan-
ship and heat of battle inherent in a lawsuit" favor granting counsel wide latitude).
139. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858 (1975) ("counsel for defense has a right to
make a closing summation ... no matter how strong the case for the prosecution"; court cites 26
cases and a treatise); see also Sodousky v. McGee, 27 Ky. (4 J.J. Marsh.) 267, 271 (1830) (natural
law right); Turley v. Kotter, 263 Pa. Super. 523, 532, 398 A.2d 699, 704 (1979) (constitutional right
in civil cases).
140. The phrase appears to have originated in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
141. See, e.g., Manninger v. Chicago & Northern Transp. Co., 64 II1. App. 3d 719, 729, 381
N.E.2d 383, 391 (1978) (when counsel makes comments that will prejudice the jury, appellate court
will reverse).
142. E.g., State v. Lee, 631 S.W.2d 453, 455-56 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (prosecution's reference
to race was not prejudicial where it was in response to one made by defendant's counsel).
143. E.g., People v. Gangestad, 105 Ill. App. 3d 774, 784, 434 N.E.2d 841, 849 (1982) (jury told
that codefendant received death penalty).
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courts will not review an issue for error, not even for most constitutional er-
rors.144 If an attorney makes no objection at all to inadmissible evidence such as
insurance-whether through ignorance, neglect, or as part of a deliberate strat-
egy-the evidence will be admitted and may be considered by the jury, even if it
has nothing to do with the merits of the case and could distract the jury from its
search for the truth. 145 Both these doctrines promote efficiency as well as adver-
sariness, although only the latter concerns us in this Article.
The wisdom of preserving adversariness sometimes is debated solely in
terms of whether it facilitates or inhibits the search for truth, as if it were merely
a component of that principle. The adversary system has been defended on the
ground that it furthers the search for truth. Partisan cross-examination is said
to be an excellent vehicle for discovering and exposing the falsehoods of menda-
cious witnesses. 14 6 The adversary structure has been touted as giving lawyers an
incentive to dig deeply for evidence; if more evidence is discovered and presented
to a jury, a truer picture of what really happened will emerge. 147 Some evidence
even shows that adversary procedures reduce the likelihood that triers of fact
will render biased decisions. 148 Conversely, the adversary nature of the system
has been criticized on the ground that it distracts the jury from truth seeking
and thus undermines the legitimacy of the trial process. 149
But it is a mistake to restrict the debate over the adversary nature of our
trial system to the question whether it facilitates the search for truth in all cases.
To do so is to insist that truth seeking be the only legitimate principle of trials.
Adversariness is a separate principle that should be debated and evaluated on its
own merits-whether it is a requirement of justice, fairness, or morality.150
The adversarial structure turns out to have a utilitarian value apart from
whether it furthers truth seeking. In a society operating under the rule of law,
court decisions generally must be accepted by the citizens. Psychologists have
demonstrated that social acceptance of verdicts does not automatically follow
from verdict accuracy. The problem is more complex. Whether trials are per-
ceived as resulting in good verdicts depends not only on whether the truth ap-
pears to have been discovered, but also on whether good procedures seem to
have been followed. Both participants and nonparticipants evaluate adversarial
144. See County Court of Ulster v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 148-54 (1979); Estelle v. Williams, 425
U.S. 501, 508-13 (1976).
145. See Thomas v. State, 423 N.E.2d 682, 686 (Ind. App. 1981).
146. See, e.g., 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (adversary cross-exami-
nation "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth").
147. See Fuller, supra note 134, at 382-85. Psychologists doubt this is always the case. See, e.g.,
J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, supra note 70, at 28-40 (results of experiment using first-year law stu-
dents suggest that discovery and presentation evidence in an adversary system operates differently
than postulated by legal theorists); Lind, supra note 57, at 21-22.
148. Lind, Thibaut & Walker, A Cross-Cultural Comparison of the Effect of Adversary and In-
quisitorial Processes on Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 62 VA. L. REV. 271 (1976); Thibaut, Walker &
Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1972).
149. M. FRANKEL, supra note 117, at 12; Gold, supra note 1, at 498.
150. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIoUsLY 22 (1977) (defining a jurisprudential princi-
ple as a standard which is observed because it is thought to be a requirement of justice, fairness, or
morality).
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trials as fairer and better than inquisitorial ones, because adversarial trials maxi-
mize participation and appear to protect individual rights and interests.15'
One of the strongest theoretical defenses of the adversarial structure of tri-
als comes from Lon Fuller. He argues that the adversarial presentation of
proofs and reasoned arguments is essential to the very development of the rule of
law. Because law evolves at least in part from decisions in specific cases, legiti-
mate laws will exist only if trials fully and fairly permit all sides to present their
arguments to neutral decision makers. Fuller maintains that the rule of law it-
self, by which society substitutes peaceful for violent ways of settling disputes,
can exist only if disputants can present their proofs and arguments in court. 152
Therefore, the principle of adversariness is a valuable part of our dispute resolu-
tion system independent of whether it facilitates or detracts from the search for
truth.
C. The Law of Trials
Critics who fear the use of psychology will damage the trial system are
making a doctrinal assumption that the law of trials allows lawyers to do as they
please. Gold's concern that new controls may have to be placed on psycholo-
gist-lawyer collaboration assumes that existing legal rules of trial procedure are
inadequate to prevent abuses. The premise that attorneys are free to subvert the
trial process by injecting extralegal factors, encouraging disregard of the law, or
manufacturing evidence, is false. Although lawyers and judges may underutilize
them, a comprehensive system of legal rules exists to prohibit most of the lawyer
trickery about which critics worry. 153 Although it is beyond the scope of this
Article to describe all the rules that constrain the conduct of attorneys at trial,
the point can be illustrated by examining the specific types of conduct in which
Professor Gold fears lawyers will engage.
Gold describes four general ways in which a lawyer, using psychology,
might successfully subvert the legitimate trial process: by selecting a biased jury,
by arousing biases in the jurors, by constantly inferring untrue or unprovable
facts, and by distracting jurors from the merits of the case. 154 He also suggests
151. Lind, supra note 57, at 15-19; Loh, The Evidence and Trial Procedure, in THE PSYCHOL-
OGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE, supra note 48, at 16; Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of
Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 541 (1978).
152. Fuller, supra note 134, at 372-85. Fuller's full philosophical defense of the adversarial
structure is, of course, not as simple as we have presented it.
153. They are described in Tanford, supra note 123; see also F. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS OF
JURY TRIALS (1959) (five volumes containing hundreds of short chapters on the early twentieth-
century law of trials); S. THOMPSON, LAW OF TRIALS IN ACTIONS CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (1889)
(description of trial law in nineteenth century).
154. See Gold, supra note 1, at 483-98. Gold also makes a fifth claim-that lawyers may im-
properly try to inject their own credibility and demeanor into the case. Id. In this claim, he is
undoubtedly correct that lawyer credibility is an improper basis for decision and lawyers are prohib-
ited from directly raising this issue. See United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 1978)
(error to state personal opinion of witness' credibility); Missouri K. T. R.R. v. Ridgway, 191 F.2d
363, 369-70 (8th Cir. 1951) (error to impugn motives of opponent); People v. Smylie, 103 Ill. App.
3d 679, 686, 431 N.E.2d 1130, 1136 (1981) (error to accuse opponent of improper tactics and
fabricating evidence); State v. Smith, 279 N.C. 163, 181 S.E.2d 458 (1971) (error to inject personal
evaluation of merits of case); Boyd v. State, 643 S.W.2d 700, 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (error to
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several specific ways lawyers might try to distract the jury: talk about them-
selves during voir dire or use voir dire to indoctrinate jurors, imply untrue facts
in their questions to witnesses or misstate facts during argument, bring in masses
of spectators, prolong their cases-in-chief, induce powerless speech in opposing
witnesses, and encourage evasion of law in their arguments.1 55 In each example,
the existing legal rules of trial procedure-if asserted by the opponent and en-
forced by the courts-will prevent the attorney from engaging in the feared
conduct.
The legal rule structure of voir dire restricts a lawyer's power to select a
favorably biased jury or induce bias in jurors during the jury selection process.
In the first place, it is a mistake to think of the voir dire process as "selection" at
all. Attorneys have no opportunity to pick anyone, biased or not, to sit on a jury.
The rules of voir dire permit attorneys only to unselect-to prevent a potentially
biased juror from being seated.156 If potential jurors are obviously biased, they
may be challenged and excused for cause.1 57 Even if the bias is not obvious, the
opponent is entitled to remove jurors peremptorily t58 and is likely to remove the
very jurors favorably disposed toward the opponent.
The fear that lawyers will induce bias in jurors through their questions also
overlooks legal rules prohibiting such conduct. The modern trend is to restrict
the participation of attorneys in voir dire and give most of the responsibility for
questioning to the judge. 159 This procedure restricts attorneys' opportunities to
"induce bias" in jurors by their questions. If an attorney does try to engage in
extensive indoctrination, ingratiation, or other diversionary tactics during voir
dire, the rules of trial procedure prohibit it. They limit attorneys to questions
relevant to the discovery of bias or other grounds for challenge' 0 and prohibit
questions that seek to indoctrinate jurors about the law161 or favorable facts.162
inject personal opinion). Gold is also probably correct that there exists no effective way to stop such
conduct. However, the credibility and demeanor of attorneys will inevitably affect jurors, whether or
not the attorney intends to create such an effect, so this problem is not unique to cases involving afh
attorney who employs psychologically sophisticated tactics.
155. See Gold, supra note 1, at 487-89, 494-95, 497.
156. See Tanford, supra note 123, at 628-38.
157. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 659 (West 1969).
158. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). Cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986) (prosecutor may not exercise peremptory challenges on the basis of race).
159. In federal courts, attorneys usually are limited to submitting written questions to the judge,
who may or may not ask them. See G. BERMANT, CONDUCT OF THE VoIR DIRE EXAMINATION:
PRACTICES AND OPINIONS OF FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 5 (1977). In state courts, judges arc now
taking over much of voir dire and limiting the participation of attorneys. See FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.300(b); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 15-2.4 (1980).
160. See, e.g., Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 737, 749-50 (Alaska 1980) (questioning to determine
bias from pretrial publicity allowed); Commonwealth v. Davis, 282 Pa. Super. 51, 53-58, 422 A.2d
671, 672-74 (1980) (questions to determine if a juror was a victim of similar crime are relevant in
exposing bias); Crosby v. Southeast Zayre, Inc., 274 S.C. 519, 521-23, 265 S.E.2d 517, 518-19 (1980)
(questioning permitted to show bias because of employment relationship with legal counsel); Trevino
v. State, 572 S.W.2d 336, 336-37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (questioning to determine if a juror had a
bias in favor of police was within proper scope of voir dire). See generally Tanford, supra note 123, at
638-44 (summarizing cases from a number of jurisdictions).
161. See generally Gold, Voir Dire: Questioning Prospective Jurors on Willingness to Follow Law,
60 IND. L.J. 163, 166-75 (1984) (good description of case law).
162. See, e.g., Hopkins v. State, 429 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ind. 1981); Rankin v. Blue Grass Boys
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The specific concern expressed by Professor Gold-that lawyers would disclose
personal facts about themselves to ingratiate themselves with the jurors-is
probably prohibited, although direct precedent is sparse.1 63 Similarly, lawyers
may not use voir dire questions as pretexts for injecting racial prejudice into a
case,164 emphasizing the existence of liability insurance,1 65 or preconditioning
jurors to a particular verdict. 16 6 One study showed that these rules are routinely
enforced by many judges, even in the absence of objection.167
Rules also prohibit attorneys from trying to arouse biases in jurors at other
stages of the trial. In opening statements, attorneys are prohibited from trying
to arouse sympathy for or antipathy against a party;16 8 appealing to class, racial,
ethnic, or religious prejudices; 169 injecting insurance, wealth, poverty, or other
information about a defendant's ability to pay a verdict;' 70 or appealing to fear,
vigilantism, or the desire for vengeance.' 71 During the presentation of evidence,
attorneys are prohibited from introducing evidence of little probative value if it
will unduly confuse issues or arouse the emotions of the jury. 17 2 In closing argu-
ment, attorneys are similarly prohibited from trying to arouse emotions or
prejudices in jurors; 17 3 suggesting that they decide the case based on the emo-
tions of the community or because the community desires a certain verdict;1 74
suggesting that the verdict will have a personal impact on the jurors; 17 or rais-
Ranch, Inc., 469 S.W.2d 767, 772-73 (Ky. 1971); State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 270, 255 A.2d 193,
199 (N.J. 1969); Commonwealth v. Werts, 483 Pa. 222, 224-25, 395 A.2d 1316, 1317-18 (1978). See
generally Fortune, Voir Dire in Kentucky: An Empirical Study of Voir Dire in the Kentucky Circuit
Courts, 69 Ky. L.J. 273, 313-15 (1981) (survey of actual practices of trial judges).
163. See Taylor v. Ross, - Ohio App. -, 78 N.E.2d 395 (dictum disapproving of attempts by
lawyer to ingratiate himself with jurors), rev'd on other grounds, 150 Ohio St. 448, 83 N.E.2d 222
(1948). See generally ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-7.2 (1980) (voir dire not to be
used to present inadmissible matter to the jury); Tanford, supra note 123, at 643-44 (using voir dire
for ingratiation and indoctrination is improper).
164. See Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 108, 120-21, 116 Cal. Rptr. 713, 720-21
(1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
165. See Yust v. Link, 569 S.W.2d 236, 238-39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Roman v. Mitchell, 82 N.J.
336, 347-49, 413 A.2d 322, 328 (1980).
166. See Hopkins v. State, 429 N.E.2d 631, 634-35 (Ind. 1981). A few jurisdictions permit such
questions at the judge's discretion. See, e.g., Geehan v. Monahan, 382 F.2d 111, 115-16 (7th Cir.
1967).
167. See Fortune, supra note 162, at 297-98; see also Strawn, Ending the Voir Dire Wars, JUDGES
J., Spring 1979, at 45 (suggestions to judges on when to intervene in voir dire).
168. Eg., Nevels v. State, 351 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (statement concerning
suffering of victim's family held improper); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. List, 424 S.W.2d
761, 764-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (opponent's husband in prison).
169. E.g., Donald v. Matheny, 276 Ala. 52, 57, 158 So. 2d 909, 913 (1963); Manning v. State,
195 Tenn. 94, 257 S.W.2d 6, (1953).
170. E.g., Palmer v. Emery Transp. Co., 130 Il. App. 2d 125, 128-30, 268 N.E.2d 238, 240-41
(1970).
171. E.g., People v. Johnson, 43 Il1. App. 3d 649, 659, 357 N.E.2d 151, 159 (1976).
172. E.g., FED. R. EvID. 403.
173. See McWilliams v. Sentinel Pub. Co., 339 I1. App. 83, 104-05, 89 N.E.2d 266, 275 (1949)
(error to try to arouse religious prejudices); State v. Wilson, 404 So. 2d 968, 969-71 (La. 1981) (error
to attempt to arouse racial prejudice); People v. Leverette, 112 Mich. App. 142, 315 N.W.2d 876,
880-82 (1982) (error to try to arouse sympathy for crime victim).
174. See Hines v. State, 425 So. 2d 589, 591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (error to argue that jurors
should use this opportunity to send message to other criminals); Prado v. State, 626 S.W.2d 775,
776-77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (error to ask jury to convict because it was desire of community).
175. See Byrns v. St. Louis County, 295 N.W. 2d 517, 520-21 (Minn. 1980) (error to suggest that
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ing issues concerning the wealth, poverty, or insurance of the parties. 17 6
One of the recurring concerns expressed by Professor Gold is that lawyers,
acting on the advice of psychologists, will constantly allude to untrue or unprov-
able facts until the jury comes to believe them to be true.177 This tactic is hardly
new. Trial lawyers often have claimed that they can affect the verdict by insinu-
ating unprovable facts,17 8 and appellate courts have been reversing such fraudu-
lently obtained judgments for a hundred years. 17 9 The law prohibits lawyers
from using a question to make a rhetorical point, 180 from insinuating facts that
the witness denies to be true,181 from implying they believe a witness to be ly-
ing, 182 and from suggesting the existence of a fact they cannot legally prove.183
Thus, if a lawyer were to try constantly to infer unprovable facts, the opponent
may object, and the court should sustain that objection, cautioning the attorney
or holding her in contempt if she persists.' 8 4 In addition, it is unethical to try
this tactic. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct state: "[A] lawyer
shall not ... in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably
believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence."' 185
Neither may the attorney misstate, exaggerate, or imply the existence of
unintroduced facts during jury argument. In an opening statement, it is im-
proper to allude to inadmissible evidence' 8 6 or facts that are unprovable because
jury consider verdict's impact on tax rate); Finney v. G.C. Murphy Co., 400 Pa. 46, 49-50, 161 A.2d
385, 387 (1960) (error to suggest that a plaintiff's verdict would cause insurance rates in community
to rise).
176. See Klein v. Herring, 347 So. 2d 681, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Manninger v. Chicago
& N.W. Transp. Co., 64 Ill. App. 3d 719, 725-31, 381 N.E.2d 383, 388-92 (1978); White v. Piles, 589
S.W.2d 220, 221-22 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
177. See Gold, supra note 1, at 488-89, 495.
178. E.g., J. ERLICH, THE LOST ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 142-47 (1970) (attorney claimed
he obtained Billie Holiday's acquittal on drug charges by insinuating she had been framed although
he was unable to offer any actual evidence of that claim).
179. See, eg., People v. Wells, 100 Cal. 459, 462-63, 34 P. 1078, 1079 (1893) (improper for a
lawyer to ask a question he knows is inadmissible and wrong); Deilkes v. State, 141 Ind. 23, 26-27,
40 N.E. 120, 121 (1895) (error to insinuate victim was quarrelsome and dangerous man).
180. See Self v. Dye, 257 Ark. 360, 364-65, 516 S.W.2d 397, 400 (1974); In re Will of Kemp, 236
N.C. 680, 685, 73 S.E.2d 906, 910 (1953).
181. See State v. Cuevas, 288 N.W.2d 525, 531-32 (Iowa 1980); see also State v. Barcomb, 136
Vt. 141, 142, 385 A.2d 1089, 1089-90 (1978) (improper to misquote and exaggerate witness
testimony).
182. See State v. Blount, 4 N.C. App. 561, 567-68, 167 S.E.2d 444, 448-49 (1969); see also
Denbeaux & Risinger, Questioning Questions: Objections to Form in the Interrogation of Witnesses,
33 ARK. L. REV. 439, 485-86 (calling the problem "argumentative editorial comment").
183. See Franks v. State, 262 Ind. 649, 658, 323 N.E.2d 221, 226 (1975) (error to insinuate client
passed lie detector test).
184. See Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 108, 128-29, 116 Cal. Rptr. 713, 726-27
(1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975) (lawyer held in contempt for deliberately asking question
insinuating existence of inadmissible prior conviction). Gold suggests that the opponent is ill-
equipped to respond, possessing only the "tools of... cross-examination, counter-evidence, and
argument." Gold, supra note 1, at 504. Gold omits reference to the fourth formidable weapon in the
opponent's arsenal: objections.
185. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4 (1983); see also MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(C) (1980) (similar); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 3-5.7, 4-7.6 (1980) (it is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer to ask a question that implies
the existence of a factual predicate for which a good faith belief is lacking).
186. E.g., United States v. DeRosa, 548 F.2d 464, 470 (3d Cir. 1977); Smith v. Covell, 100 Cal.
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no witness is available to testify to them.187 In closing argument, it is similarly
improper to allude to facts not in the record or to misstate testimony, especially
if it relates to a central issue, 188 is cumulative of similar attempts to go beyond
the record, 189 or is done in contravention of an express ruling by the court.190
Another recurring concern is that attorneys will use various ploys to distort
the merits of the case or distract the jury away from them. Gold specifically
mentions four methods: lawyers might bring in a large number of spectators to
divert the jury's attention,191 prolong their cases-in-chief so the jury will forget
the opponent's evidence,192 induce powerless speech in the other side's witnesses
so their credibility is diminished, 193 or encourage jurors to invoke their personal
values to nullify the law. 194 None of these scenarios is realistic; legal rules pro-
hibit or restrict such tactics. Packing the courtroom with distracting or intimi-
dating spectators is prohibited, and the judge in such cases may clear the
courtroom before proceeding.195 Attorneys do not have sole discretion over how
long they take to present their cases. The court may place time limits on a
party's presentation or restrict the presentation of cumulative or delay-causing
evidence.' 9 6 As to inducing powerless speech in the opponent's witnesses, the
rules restrict an attorney's access to the most important opposing witness-the
opposing party. 1 9 7 The rules give a witness the right to refuse to talk to lawyers
at all,198 and give the court power to restrict a lawyer's access to a witness if she
App. 3d 947, 957-60, 161 Cal. Rptr. 377, 383-85 (1980); State v. Waste Management, Inc., 81 Wis.
2d 555, 573-74, 261 N.W.2d 147, 155, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 865 (1978).
187. E.g., People v. Parks, 49 Ill. App. 3d 65, 67, 363 N.E.2d 93, 95 (1977); State v. Kenny, 128
N.J. Super. 94, 109-11, 319 A.2d 232, 240-41 (1974), aff'd, 68 N.J. 17, 342 A.2d 189 (1975).
188. See, eg., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 86-89 (1935); Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559,
568-71 (Del. 1981); State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 516-17, 212 S.E.2d 125, 131 (1975).
189. See People v. Cart, 102 Ill. App. 3d 173, 185-86, 429 N.E.2d 553, 563 (1981) (prosecutor
attempted to focus jury's attention on defendant's failure to testify as corroborative of guilt; one
reference would be permitted, but six would require reversal), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 942 (1982).
190. See, eg., United States v. Hickman, 468 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Intermoun-
tain Farmers Ass'n v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162, 1165-66 (Utah 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860
(1978).
191. Gold, supra note I, at 494.
192. Gold, supra note 1, at 497.
193. Gold, supra note 1, at 485.
194. Gold, supra note 1, at 498-500. It is not entirely clear that Gold thinks jury nullification is
bad. He seems to approve of jurors using community values to nullify laws, but disapproves of
jurors using their own personal values.
195. See People v. Craig, 86 Cal. App. 3d 905, 919-20, 150 Cal. Rptr. 676, 684-85 (1978) (court
should not permit interference by spectators and pickets if the conduct is prejudicial to defendant or
influences the verdict); State v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d 449, 454-55 (W. Va. 1985) (fair trial denied
when judge did nothing to prevent presence of 20-30 spectators wearing Mothers Against Drunk
Driving buttons).
196. See M.C.I. Communication Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel., 708 F.2d 1081, 1170-72 (7th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Maloney v. Wake Hosp. Sys., 45 N.C. App. 172, 180,
262 S.E.2d 680, 684-85 (1980); see also FED. R. EVID. 403 (needlessly cumulative, repetitive evi-
dence that causes undue delay may be excluded although relevant).
197. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 4.2, 4.3 (1983) (prohibiting most
communications with adverse party); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
104(A)(1) (1980) (similar).
198. See People v. Mitchell, 16 Ill. App. 2d 189, 193, 147 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1958).
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attempts to influence how or to what the witness will testify. 19 9 It also is im-
proper for attorneys to urge that jurors nullify or evade the law for any reason,
directly or indirectly.2 °
Finally, Professor Gold fears that the use of such psychological trickery is
virtually undetectable by the opposing attorney and by the judge, so they have
no realistic way to prevent it.2 0 ' To some extent, of course, he is correct. The
opposing lawyer can determine neither whether another lawyer is wearing a blue
suit on purpose or by chance, nor if she is consciously trying to take advantage
of primacy and recency effects. However, effects from such events are going to
be present whether intended or not. The lawyer must wear some kind of cloth-
ing, and some arguments must come first and last. Fear that a deliberate at-
tempt to use such techniques to influence the jury will go undetected is
misplaced if nothing could be done to remedy it if such a ploy were detected.
Such nonevidentiary effects are not eliminated if we make the lawyer change her
suit or make another argument first-they are merely changed.
The more serious kinds of diversionary activities are those that seek to add
something to the trial that would not otherwise be present. Such activities are
carried out in the open and are readily detectable. It should be obvious if during
voir dire an attorney talks about herself, tries to indoctrinate on the law or
favorable facts, tries to precommit jurors to a certain verdict, or injects racial or
other emotional issues. It also should be obvious if the attorney tries to insinu-
ate unprovable or untrue facts or appeals to the jurors' emotions during any
stage of the trial, brings in large numbers of spectators, prolongs the presenta-
tion of evidence, or encourages jury nullification. That in a large number of
cases the propriety of such tactics is reviewed on appeal demonstrates that law-
yers and judges can detect their use.20 2 In such cases, the only thing not detect-
able is whether the attorney was trying to use psychology or her own intuition.
Rules of trial procedure have never turned on such a distinction.
IV. THE BENEFITS OF PSYCHOLOGIST-LAWYER COLLABORATION
The critics of psychologist-lawyer collaboration speculate about possible
199. See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 2d 134, 139-40, 317 P.2d 130, 133-34
(1957); State v. Storrs, 112 Wash. 675, 677-79, 192 P. 984, 985-86 (1920).
200. See State v. Thomas, 239 N.W.2d 455, 456-57 (Minn. 1976) (error in closing argument to
suggest that jury circumvent law); People v. Fields, 27 A.D. 2d 736, 277 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1967) (simi-
lar); Lewes v. John Crane & Sons, 78 Vt. 216, 219-20, 62 A. 60, 61 (1905) (attorneys prohibited in
opening statement from suggesting that jurors can do anything other than take law from judge).
Professor Gold's position that jury nullification based on community values is a fundamental part of
the legitimacy of the trial process is unique. Most legal scholars, and appellate courts in 48 out of
the 50 states, believe that juries have no power to disregard state or federal law that conflicts with
community values. See generally Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Con-
troversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (Autumn 1980) (surveying issue). It is difficult to imagine
that Gold really means a jury could apply community values to permit the local school board to
segregate classes and require mandatory Christian prayer, however much that decision might reflect
prevailing community values. The only area in which juries effectively have nullification power is in
criminal cases in which an acquittal is unreviewable.
201. See Gold, supra note 1, at 483, 497, 504, 511.
202. See supra notes 153-200.
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negative aspects of this cooperation, separating such aspects from the broader
context of general psycholegal research. They seem to assume that psychology
is only useful for deceiving jurors and interfering with accurate verdicts. They
completely overlook the possibility that the truth-seeking function of trials
might benefit from this collaboration. Taken as a whole, psycholegal research is
not aimed predominantly at improving adversarial presentation at the expense of
verdict accuracy, but at improving the fairness of trials and the reliability of
verdicts.20 3 This interdisciplinary collaboration has, on balance, improved the
just operation of the trial system, and has the potential to improve it even more.
Psychologists have discovered numerous flaws in the structure of the legal
system that raise doubts about the accuracy of many jury verdicts. Perhaps the
most significant of such research demonstrates that, although jurors tend to ac-
cept eyewitness testimony unquestioningly, in fact eyewitnesses often are wrong.
Many factors can reduce the reliability of an eyewitness' initial perception,2 °4
cause deterioration of memory,20 5 or induce inaccurate recollection. 20 6 Psy-
chologists also have demonstrated that other factors may cast doubt on the ac-
curacy of verdicts. Many traditional pattern jury instructions are too complex
and difficult for jurors to understand. 20 7 Some accepted rules of trial procedure
have been shown to have unintended biasing effects. 20 8 For example, it has been
203. Psycholegal research has also proved beneficial to the structuring of fair methods of alterna-
tive dispute resolution, such as negotiation and mediation. The research has assessed the effective-
ness of various dispute resolution strategies in terms of outcomes, perceptions of fairness, and
satisfaction among parties. See Heuer & Penrod, Procedural Preference as a Function of Conflict
Intensity, 51 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 700 (1986); Houlden, Impact of Procedural
Modifications on Evaluations of Plea Bargaining, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 267 (1981); Rubin, Experi-
mental Research on Third-Party Intervention in Conflict: Toward Some Generalizations, 87 PSYCHO-
LOGICAL BULL. 379 (1980). A full description of this research is beyond the scope of this Article,
204. E.g., B. CLIFFORD & R. BULL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSON IDENTIFICATION 82-89
(1978) (cross-racial identifications are less accurate than own race identifications); Hintzman, Repeti-
tion and Memory, in 10 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 47, 53-54 (G. Bower
ed. 1976) (eyewitness identifications are not very accurate if viewing time was short); Penrod, Loftus
& Winkler, supra note 48, at 124-44 (situational factors such as stress, seriousness of the offense
viewed, and presence of weapons or disguises affect eyewitness accuracy). The research is summa-
rized in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 50; Levine & Tapp,
Eyewitness Identification: Problems and Pitfalls, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A SOCIAL-
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 81, at 99.
205. Eg., Shepard, Recognition Memory for Words, Sentences, and Pictures, 6 J. VERBAL
LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 156 (1967) (identifications less accurate as the time between viewing
and identification increases).
206. For example, inaccurate recall can be induced by police questioning, see E. LoFrus, supra
note 48, at 88-109; Loftus & Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Example of the
Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 585
(1974) (questions containing suggestions as to how the questioner views the event affects how wit-
nesses recall it), or by suggestive lineup procedures, see Malpass & Devine, Eyewitness Identification:
Lineup Instructions and the Absence of the Offender, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 482 (198 1); Wells,
The Psychology of Lineup Identifications, 14 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 89 (1984).
207. See A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J. ALFINI, supra note 57, at 3-24; Charrow & Charrow,
Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM.
L. REV. 1306, 1318-20 (1979); Elwork, Sales & Alfini, Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or
in Light of It?, I LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 163, 178 (1977); Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability
of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 153 (1982).
208. Some of the research is summarized in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PRO-
CEDURE, supra note 48; J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, supra note 70, at 54-66; Lind, The Psychology of
Courtroom Procedure, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM, supra note 48, at 24-27.
[Vol. 66
1988] PSYCHOLOGICAL TECHNIQUES IN THE COURTROOM 773
demonstrated that jurors can be biased against a defendant and inclined to be-
lieve him guilty in the absence of evidence if he is charged with multiple of-
fenses 20 9 or if they hear evidence of a criminal record. 2 10 Attempts to correct
the biasing effect of such evidence with a limiting or cautionary instruction, long
assumed to be effective by the courts, often turn out to aggravate rather than
ameliorate the prejudice. 2 11
Psycholegal research not only identifies such flaws, but offers concrete sug-
gestions for improving these weaknesses in our legal system. Psychologists have
discovered ways in which law enforcement officials could improve eyewitness
accuracy21 2 and have suggested how courts can assist jurors in discriminating
between accurate and inaccurate identifications.2 13 They have used psycho-
linguistic principles to devise techniques for making instructions more compre-
hensible2 14 and have discovered that some general instructions may only be
effective if given at the start, rather than the end, of trial.2 15 Fairer, less biased,
and more accurate trials would be possible if stricter standards for allowing join-
der of offenses were imposed,2 16 or if instructions to disregard generally were
eliminated in favor of simple rulings sustaining the inadmissibility of prejudicial
evidence. 2 17
209. See Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 59, at 366-69; Bordens & Horowitz, Joinder of Crimi-
nal Offenses: A Review of the Legal and Psychological Literature, 9 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 339
(1985); Greene & Loftus, When Crimes Are Joined at Trial, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 193 (1985);
Horowitz, Bordens & Feldman, A Comparison of Verdicts Obtained in Severed and Joined Criminal
Trials, 10 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 444 (1980); Tanford & Penrod, supra note 53; Tanford &
Penrod, supra note 59; Tanford, Penrod & Collins, Decision Making in Joined Criminal Trials: The
Influence of Charge Similarity, Evidence Similarity, and Limiting Instructions, 9 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 319, 332-335 (1985).
210. See Cornish & Sealy, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 208, 215-18;
Doob & Kirshenbaum, supra note 54, at 93-96; Hans & Doob, supra note 86, at 242-43; Wissler &
Saks, supra note 54, at 43-47.
211. See Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, supra note 58, at 351-53; Tanford & Cox, Decision Processes in
Civil Cases: The Impact of Impeachment Evidence on Liability and Credibility Judgments, 2 Soc.
BEHAV. (1987) (giving limiting instruction on use of convictions for impeachment aggravates infer-
ence of negative character); Thompson, Fong & Rosenhan, supra note 58; Wolf & Montgomery,
supra note 58, at 216-18.
212. See, e.g., Krafka & Penrod, Reinstatement of Context in a Field Experiment on Eyewitness
Identification, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 58 (1985) (using memory aids, such as
context reinstatement, may further improve eyewitness identifications); Lipton, On the Psychology of
Eyewitness Testimony, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 90, 94 (1977) (witnesses describing an event in
narrative form may be more accurate than when answering specific questions); Wells, Applied Eye-
witness Testimony Research: System Variables and Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOLOGY 1546 (1978) (suggesting that eyewitness accuracy can be improved through better
lineup and interrogation methods); Wells, supra note 206 (using an initial blank lineup not contain-
ing the actual suspect may lead to more accurate identifications in a second lineup).
213. See Wells, supra note 98, at 89-91 (use of psychological experts to educate jurors improves
their ability to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate identifications).
214. See, e.g., A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J. ALFINI, supra note 57, at 145-80.
215. See Kassin & Wrightsman, On the Requirements of Proof- The Timing of Judicial Instruc-
tion and Mock Juror Verdicts, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 1877 (1979) (instruction
about proof beyond reasonable doubt). Indeed, the modem trend is to give such general instructions
at the beginning. See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CENTER COMM. TO STUDY CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 1-2, 5 (1982).
216. See Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 209; Greene & Loftus, supra note 209; Horowitz,
Bordens & Feldman, supra note 209; Tanford & Penrod, supra note 53.
217. See Wolf & Montgomery, supra note 58. Experiments by one of the authors of this article
show that this issue is complex. In at least some cases, when the inadmissible evidence does not
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Psycholegal research also can contribute to lawmakers' decisions on how
best to structure the trial system. It has played a central role in formulating two
important legal rules. The first concerns acceptable jury size. Psychological re-
search shows that smaller juries are less representative of the community, are
less likely to recall significant trial information, spend less time deliberating, and
are more likely to pressure minority factions into conformity. Psychologists
have found that twelve-member juries produce better verdicts than six-member
juries, and that verdict reliability deteriorates significantly with fewer than six
jurors.218 The United States Supreme Court in Ballew v. Georgia219 followed
only part of the findings and set the minimum constitutionally acceptable jury at
six persons, apparently willing to give up some verdict reliability for the sake of
efficiency and federalism.
The second issue to which psycholegal research could make a significant
contribution concerns the effect of "death qualifying" a jury. Research has
clearly shown that by excluding from capital juries those persons who are un-
willing to consider the death penalty, the resulting jury is conviction prone, 220
unrepresentative of the community,22 1 and attitudinally biased. 222 Further evi-
dence suggests that the death penalty questioning process itself produces addi-
tional biases in jurors. 223 On this issue, the Supreme Court has chosen to ignore
the research and permit such biased juries to decide guilt despite the reduced
likelihood of reliable verdicts.224 In response, psychologists have begun experi-
involve criminality or immorality, instructions to disregard can reduce, although not eliminate, prej-
udice. Cox & Tanford, Effects of Evidence and Instructions in Civil Trials: An Experimental Inves-
tigation of Rules of Admissibility (1987) (unpublished manuscript) (compromise offers, remedial
measures).
218. See R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 70, at 27-36; Kerr, Atkin,
Stasser, Meek, Holt & Davis, Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition and
Assigned Decision Rule on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY
282 (1976); Roper, Jury Size and Verdict Consistency: "A Line Has to Be Drawn Somewhere," 14
LAW & Soc'y REV. 977 (1980); Tanke & Tanke, Getting Offa Slippery Slope: Social Science in the
Judicial Process, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1130 (1979); Valenti & Downing, Differential Effects of
Jury Size on Verdicts Following Deliberation as a Function of Apparent Guilt of a Defendant, 32 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 655 (1975). Perhaps the best explanation and analysis of the
jury size research is M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS (1977).
219. 435 U.S. 223, 229-44 (1978).
220. American Psychological Ass'n, In the Supreme Court of the United States: Lockhart v.
McCree, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 59 (1987) (research clear and convincing); see Cowan, Thompson &
Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors' Predispostion to Convict and on the Quality
of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53, 67-78 (1984); Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a
"Death Qualified" Jury on the Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 567, 582-85 (1971).
221. See Bronson, On the Conviction-Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-Qualified
Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 15-30 (1970); Fitzgerald
& Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 31, 39-48 (1984).
222. See Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 221, at 39-48; Jurow, supra note 220, at 585-88;
Vidmar & Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1245, 1258-62 (1974).
223. See Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-Qualifica-
tion Process, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1984); Haney, Examining Death Qualification: Further
Analysis of the Process Effect, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 133 (1984). Some research has indicated that
different questioning procedures can reduce the prejudice of the death qualification process. See Cox
& Tanford, An Alternative Method of Capital Jury Selection (1987) (unpublished manuscript).
224. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986). Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, which
tried to explain away the psychological research, is an excellent example of how laypersons tend to
reject scientific knowledge in favor of folklore and traditional ignorance. Id. at 1762-64.
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menting with different questioning procedures to see if they can increase the
pool of eligible jurors and thereby reduce the biasing effect normally associated
with death qualification. 225
Psycholegal research also benefits the trial system in another way. It can
help lawyers identify and counteract biases and prejudices in jurors that would
otherwise interfere with their ability to reach reliable verdicts. Lawyers who
collaborate with psychologists or read the psychological literature can gather
more reliable evidence before trial, more effectively identify and eliminate biased
jurors during voir dire, reduce the biasing effect of evidence presented during
trial, and present clearer and more understandable arguments.
The work of social scientists has made possible the gathering of more relia-
ble information from witnesses before trial. For example, it has been demon-
strated that witnesses are more accurate when they describe an event in
narrative form than when they are asked specific questions,226 because the way
questions are worded actually can affect a witness' memory.227 Witnesses also
are more accurate if interviewed promptly, because their memories of what hap-
pened deteriorate drastically after a few days. 228 Social scientists have discov-
ered that interviewer bias can influence the fact-gathering process and have
offered suggestions for reducing its impact.229 They have made lawyers aware of
the importance of nonverbal communication and cues,230 and of how to use
these cues to detect deception. 23 1 Much also has been written about inhibitors
and facilitators of communication,232 including strategies for overcoming wit-
ness reluctance to cooperate.2 33 Psychologists have even shown that where the
interviewer sits in relation to the witness affects the flow of information.234 This
knowledge enables investigators to conduct better interviews with witnesses,
which produce more reliable information and facilitate more informed jury
decisions.
When cases go to trial, most people would probably agree it is important to
seat an impartial and unbiased jury that will fairly hear what both sides have to
say.2 35 Psychologists have studied inherent juror biases and have suggested
ways lawyers can uncover them or reduce their probable impact. Survey re-
225. See Cox & Tanford, supra note 223.
226. See Lipton, supra note 212.
227. See Loftus & Palmer, supra note 206.
228. See Shepard, supra note 205.
229. See, eg., R. KAHN & C. CANNELL, THE DYNAMICS OF INTERVIEWING 59-61, 180-83, 187-
93 (1957).
230. See, eg., R. BIRDWHISTELL, KINEsICS AND CONTEXT 157-58 (1970).
231. See Ekman & Friesen, Nonverbal Leakage and Clues to Deception, 32 PSYCHIATRY 88, 93-
94 (1969).
232. E.g., R. GORDEN, INTERVIEWING: STRATEGY, TECHNIQUES, AND TACTICS 104-09, 112-
19, 123-33 (rev. ed. 1975).
233. See id. at 190-92, 451-52; R. KAHN & C. CANNELL, supra note 229, at 143-48.
234. See Broekmann & Moller, Preferred Seating Position and Distance in Various Situations, 20
J. COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGY 504 (1973); Patterson & Sechrest, Interpersonal Distance and Impres-
sion Formation, 38 J. PERSONALITY 161 (1970).
235. But see Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 1764, 1766 (1986) (jury biased in favor of
state is constitutionally acceptable to further state's interest in enforcing death penalty laws).
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search techniques have been devised which can be used prior to trial to uncover
community biases that could prevent a fair and impartial trial in that venue. 236
Psychologists also have identified certain personality traits, present in large seg-
ments of the population, which tend to predispose such persons toward particu-
lar verdicts regardless of evidence, and have suggested ways in which these traits
can be identified in a panel of prospective jurors.237 Social psychological re-
search on attitudes has identified ways in which the negative impact of inherent
prejudices can be reduced during jury selection. Simply forewarning the jurors
about specific biases and prejudices that might arise during trial can lessen their
impact on the verdict.238 Obtaining public commitments from the jurors during
voir dire to follow the law and put aside biases helps assure that the promised
behavior will be enacted.239
Psycholegal research also can help attorneys identify which prospective ju-
rors might be biased against their sides in particular cases. Psychologists have
demonstrated that the traditional practice of asking jurors fairly specific ques-
tions may not effectively identify biased jurors. 24° They have studied the terri-
bly difficult problem of obtaining honest answers from prospective jurors in a
formal, public setting in which they will be inclined to give socially acceptable
responses. 241 They have shown that open-ended individual questions that en-
courage jurors to talk are more apt to uncover juror prejudices, although signifi-
cant self-disclosure is likely to occur only through nonpublic questioning.242
Studies have indicated that jurors may disclose more about themselves when the
attorney stands relatively close to the juror and appears to be of slightly higher
236. See Nietzel & Dillehay, Psychologists as Consultants for Changes of Venue: The Use of
Public Opinion Surveys, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 309 (1983). Surveys demonstrating bias have been
successfully used to achieve changes of venue when fair trials would have been unlikely in the origi-
nal venue. See McConahay, Mullin & Frederick, supra note 93, at 209-13; Vidmar & Judson, The
Use of Social Science Data in a Change of Venue Application: A Case Study, 59 CANADIAN B. REV.
76 (1981).
237. See T. ADORNO, E. FRENKEL-BRUNSWICK, D. LEVINSON & R. SANFORD, THE AUTHORI-
TARIAN PERSONALITY 224-42 (1950); Berkowitz & Wolkon, A Forced Choice Form ofthe F-Scale-
Free From Acquiescent Response Set, 27 SOCIOMETRY 54 (1964); Boehm, Mr. Prejudice, Miss Sympa-
thy, and the Authoritarian Personality: An Application of Psychological Measuring Techniques to the
Problem of Jury Bias, 1968 WIs. L. REV. 734, 738-50; Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 221, at 39-
50; Jurow, supra note 220, at 588-98.
238. See Linz & Penrod, supra note 72, at 17-24; McGuire, Inducing Resistance to Persuasion, in
1 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 191 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1964); MeGuire, Atti-
tudes and Attitude Change, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 45, at 233, 263-64,
272-73; Petty & Cacioppo, Forewarning, Cognitive Responding, and Resistance to Persuasion, 35 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 645 (1977).
239. See McGuire, Attitudes and Attitude Change, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY,
supra note 45, at 293; Pallak, Cook & Sullivan, Commitment and Energy Conservation, in I APPLIED
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ANNUAL 235 (L. Bickman ed. 1981). For background placing commitments
in a broader theoretical context, see C. KIESLER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COMMITMENT (1971); R.
WICKLUND & J. BREHM, PERSPECTIVES ON COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1976).
240. See Balch, Griffiths, Hall & Winfree, The Socialization of Jurors: The Voir Dire as a Rite of
Passage, 4 J. CRIM. JUST. 271 (1976); Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S.
CAL. L. REV. 503, 505-21 (1965).
241. See Helmreich & Collins, Situational Determinants of Affiliative Preference Under Stress, 6
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 79 (1967); McGhee & Teevan, Conformity Behavior and Need
for Affiliation, 72 J. SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 117 (1967).
242. See Suggs & Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social Science Analysis, 56 IND.
L.J. 245, 260 (1981).
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social status.243 Psychologists have tried to provide guides to interpreting non-
verbal behavior cues which can indicate when more probing is necessary or even
when a juror is being deceptive.244
Psychologists also have suggested how lawyers can most effectively use this
information to challenge jurors likely to be biased in favor of the other side.24 5
Their research has shown that, contrary to many traditional "common sense"
theories of exercising challenges, 246 few general characteristics of jurors will pre-
dict how they will decide particular cases.247 Instead, psychological research
suggests that lawyers should assess specific attitudes relevant to each particular
case, because specific attitudes are likely to be better predictors of juror behavior
than are general attitudes. 248 They caution against making decisions on which
jurors to challenge based on stereotypes. 249 Reducing the frequency with which
lawyers rely on racial and ethnic stereotypes also has had the side effect of im-
proving the appearance of justice.
In the trial's evidence presentation phase, psycholegal research can help
attorneys present evidence more coherently so that it is heard, understood, and
remembered by jurors. For example, researchers on the Duke Law and Lan-
guage Project discovered that witnesses who used "powerless" speech patterns
associated with low social status were viewed by jurors as less convincing, truth-
ful, competent, intelligent, and trustworthy than other witnesses.25 0 Work on
primacy and recency effects, although it has been overemphasized, has helped
attorneys structure witness testimony so that its important parts are emphasized
and more likely to be remembered and understood.251 Similar work has shown
the importance of repetition and vivid presentation techniques in helping the
243. Id. at 253-56, 262-64.
244. See Miller & Burgoon, Factors Affecting Assessments of Witness Credibility, in THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM, supra note 48, at 169; Suggs & Sales, Using Communication Cues to
Evaluate Prospective Jurors During the Voir Dire, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 629, 632-38 (1978).
245. In his article, Professor Gold uses this same research on how to identify biased jurors to
argue that lawyers will identify favorably biased jurors, put them on the jury, and thereby create a
biased jury. He overlooks the fact that lawyers have no power to select a favorably biased juror to
sit; lawyers may only remove a negatively biased juror. See supra note 123. If both lawyers identify
and remove those jurors most extremely biased against them, the resulting jury will obviously be
more impartial than it otherwise would have been.
246. See, e.g., 1 F. LANE, GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE §§ 9.29 -.32 (2d ed. 1971) (sug-
gesting, for example, that in personal injury cases, overweight men between 30 and 55 years of age
with Irish, French, Spanish, Italian, or Jewish heritage and no prior jury service are desirable for
plaintiff).
247. See R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 70, at 121-50; Hans & Vidmar,
Jury Selection, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM, supra note 48, at 39, 63-72.
248. See generally I. AJZEN & M. FISHBEIN, UNDERSTANDING ATTITUDES AND PREDICTING
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1980); M. FISHBEIN & I. AJZEN, BELIEF, ATTITUDE, INTENTION AND BEHAV-
IOR (1975) (thorough general reviews and difficulties of predicting specific behavior based on
attitudes).
249. See R. HASTIE, S. PENROD, & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 70, at 149-50.
250. See Conley, O'Barr & Lind, supra note 6, at 1385-89.
251. See J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, supra note 70, at 54-66; Anderson. Integration Theory
Applied to Cognitive Responses and Attitudes, in COGNITIVE RESPONSES IN PERSUASION 371 (R.
Petty, T. Ostrom, & T. Brock eds. 1981); Lawson, supra note 52, at 541-42. But see supra text
accompanying notes 79-80 (caution about primacy effect data).
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jury to remember the important evidence.252
The research efforts of psychologists also have helped attorneys present
their arguments more clearly, so that their sides of cases are understood by the
jury. The research has shown, for example, that arguments should be simplified
and kept focused on a few main points, because trying to resolve too many mi-
nor issues is only confusing.253 The literature on primacy and recency effects 25 4
has helped attorneys structure their arguments so the important issues and fac-
tual disputes get emphasized and the jury is not misled into focusing on unim-
portant issues. Similarly, research has shown that jurors remember and
understand complicated facts better if they are written on an exhibit.255 Psychol-
ogists also have discovered ways in which attorneys may unintentionally inter-
fere with their own presentations by making erroneous psychological
assumptions. Deliberate attempts to speak slowly in order to be understood bet-
ter may actually result in a decrease in comprehension. 256 Attorneys may inten-
tionally stand far away from the jury to avoid making them uncomfortable, or
very close to adopt a "country lawyer" approach, hoping thereby to facilitate
comprehension. Again, the result in either case will probably be a reduction in
successful communication. 257 Similarly, attorneys may stand behind a lectern in
an effort to appear more expert, not knowing that such positioning has a nega-
tive effect on communication. 258 Psychologists also have debunked the old trial
lawyer's myth that they should leave an important conclusion implicit, because
ifjurors draw the conclusion themselves, they will be more committed to it. The
most likely real result of such a strategy is that jurors will not understand the
attorney's message. 259 Finally, psychological research has itself provided at
least a partial answer to the concern that the opposing lawyer may try to deceive
the jury or arouse their biases. By exposing an opponent's tricks, especially if
the jury can be forewarned, an attorney can reduce the biasing effect to a
minimum.260
It is certainly true that the legal profession does not always use research
findings in the way psychologists would like them to be used. Some of the exper-
252. See Cacioppo & Petty, Effects of Message Repetition and Position on Cognitive Response,
Recall, and Persuasion, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 97 (1979); McCullough & Ostrom,
Repetition of Highly Similar Messages and Attitude Changes, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 395
(1974).
253. See Calder, Insko & Yandell, supra note 91; Linz & Penrod, supra note 72, at 28-29.
254. See Insko, Lind & LaTour, supra note 52; Lind & Ke, Opening and Closing Statements, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE, supra note 48, at 229 (recommends
opening arguments instead of statements to overcome potential bias).
255. Chaiken & Eagley, Communication Modality as a Determinant of Message Persuasiveness
and Message Comprehensibility, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 605 (1976); Linz & Pen-
rod, supra note 72, at 7-8.
256. See Miller, Maruyama, Beaber & Valone, supra note 51, at 617.
257. See Albert & Dabbs, Physical Distance and Persuasion, 15 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY-
CHOLOGY 265 (1970).
258. See J. RUESCH & W. KEES, NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION: NOTES ON THE VISUAL PER-
CEPTION OF HUMAN RELATIONS 128 (1956).
259. See Linz & Penrod, supra note 72, at 26-27; McGuire, Attitudes and Attitude Change, in 2
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 45, at 271-73.
260. See Linz & Penrod, supra note 72, at 17-24; Petty & Cacioppo, supra note 238,
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iments by psychologists could be used by an unscrupulous attorney to try to
divert the jury away from the merits of the case. Lawyers with losing causes
have been trying to do this for centuries; there is no evidence they have been
successful, and the trial system seems to have survived. But we cannot let con-
cerns about the possibility that science will be misused blind us to its potential
benefits. Even if the critics were justified in their fears, they would not make a
convincing case that, on balance, we need to control psychologist-lawyer collab-
oration. In this case, the benefits seem worth the risk.
V. CONCLUSION
Science has not created another monster that must be controlled. Critics
like Professor Gold who fear that psychologists have produced superlawyers ca-
pable of controlling juries and determining the outcome of trials have misunder-
stood both the psychological and legal nature of the trial process. Perhaps they
have taken too seriously the sales pitches of the entrepreneurs who promise great
results to lawyers who will hire them as consultants, and have read too little of
the actual scientific literature. That research refutes the notion that attorneys
can influence jurors to make decisions on a subconscious level based on nonevi-
dentiary factors. Instead, psycholegal research demonstrates the existence of la-
tent biases and tests ways in which their impact can be reduced so that fewer
verdicts will be decided on nonevidentiary bases. Lawyers who try to use so-
called psychological persuasion techniques to deceive jurors and divert them
from the evidence are unlikely to be successful, and will find few competent
psychologists willing to assist in deliberate juror deception. Within our adver-
sarial trial system, psychological research is of greatest benefit when lawyers use
accurate understanding of jurors' cognitive processes to both counteract existing
biases and make sure their clients' sides are heard and understood.
What the critics' fears boil down to is the worry that psychology can turn a
bad case into a winner. If one side is weak on the facts, can it get back in the
game by relying on psychology? Leading psychologists whose lives are dedi-
cated to this research think not:
The social psychologist cannot provide the attorney with a simple set
of sure fire tricks that will automatically increase persuasiveness in the
courtroom .... [U]sing the opening statement as a vehicle for provid-
ing the jurors with a theme, theory, or story will be of little use if the
attorney's theory is weak or implausible .... Likewise, it is unlikely
that presenting the jurors with counterarguments to your opponent's
position will be of value if the counterarguments are weak or uncon-
vincing. The same holds true in the presentation of expert witnesses.
The attorney cannot expect a highly credible witness to carry the day if
her testimony is weak. Similarly, the attorney should not underesti-
mate the impact of the testimony of the opponent's low credibility wit-
ness. While social psychologists can assist the trial attorney by making
an already good case better, they cannot turn a bad case into a good
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
one.
26 1
Psychological persuasion techniques are most productively employed to further
fair and impartial trials, to identify and weed out the most biased persons before
they get on the jury, to reinforce the evidence, and to assist the jurors in over-
coming their inherent biases so they can return better verdicts.
The real concern is the possibility of disparity of resources. If one side has
money and access to psychological consultants, might it be able to swing the
jury its way in close cases? Perhaps. The problem of disparity of resources,
including legal talent, is not new; it has plagued our system for generations. At
least in this case, however, the solution is obvious. The solution is not to control
or ban the use of psychology,, as some have suggested, 262 but to continue to
disseminate scientific information to all lawyers and to expand what is already
being made available. Collaboration between psychology and law through law
schools, bar associations, professional journals, and continuing legal school edu-
cation programs should be encouraged. Lawyers should be educated in rudi-
mentary research methods and statistics so they can learn to recognize valid
advice and make productive use of psychological knowledge. If all lawyers
knew enough psychology to maximize their courtroom presentation, this would
be one area in which disparate resources would not be a problem. Both the
reliability of verdicts and the adversarial function of trials would improve. We
should not fear the infusion of scientific knowledge into the courtroom. We
should welcome it.
261. Linz & Penrod, supra note 72, at 46-47.
262. See Gold, supra note 1, at 509-14; Etzioni, Threatening the Jury Trial, Washington Post,
May 26, 1974, at C3, col. 1.
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